The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
8.
Sections 6.1
and 6.2 describe military planning for operations in
Iraq.
9.
In early
September 2002, the MOD estimated that between 31 and 48
Service
Personnel
would be killed in action during the initial combat phase of
operations of an
attack on
Iraq (and that between 157 and 241 Service Personnel would be
admitted
to Role 3
hospitals).2,3
Those
figures excluded possible casualties from chemical and
biological
warfare.
10.
The MOD
regularly updated its casualty estimates as the military plan
developed.
The
estimates did not consider casualties beyond the initial combat
phase of operations.
11.
Mr Geoff
Hoon, the Defence Secretary, wrote to Mr Blair on 16 January
2003,
recommending
that the UK agree a US request to provide a large scale ground
force
for
operations in southern Iraq.
12.
Mr Hoon’s
advice did not include the estimates of UK military casualties
(including
fatalities)
that had been developed.4
13.
Mr Blair
agreed Mr Hoon’s recommendation the following
day.5
14.
On 3 February,
the MOD produced a Casualty Estimate paper for the Chiefs of
Staff
meeting
later that week.6
The paper
stated that:
•
There could
be between 30 and 50 fatalities in the Land Component.
•
There could
be between 5 and 9 fatalities in the Air Component.
•
No simple
estimate could be made of fatalities in the Maritime Component,
given
the high
impact/low probability nature of incidents.
•
Fatalities
from a “single small‑scale but well executed” chemical attack could
be
between 0
and 96 fatalities, depending on a range of factors including the
target,
the
chemical agent used, and the weather.
•
No useful
estimate could be made of fatalities from a biological attack in
the
absence of
more specific information about the circumstances of any
attack.
15.
The Chiefs of
Staff concluded on 5 February that the Casualty Estimate paper
would
need to be
shown to Ministers before any decision to commit UK troops was
made.7
2
Role 3
(Echelon 3) medical support is generally provided at field
hospitals and on hospital ships.
3
Minute MOD
[junior official] to Iraq Inquiry [junior official], 22 June 2010,
‘Iraq Inquiry – Request
for Evidence’.
4
Letter Hoon
to Blair, 16 January 2003, ‘Iraq: UK Land
Contribution’.
5
Letter
Manning to Watkins, 17 January 2003, ‘Iraq: UK Land
Contribution’.
6
Minute Fry
to COSSEC, 3 February 2003, ‘Casualty Estimates – Op TELIC’
attaching Paper MOD,
3 February
2003, ‘Casualty Estimates for Op TELIC Based on Operational
Analysis’.
7
Minutes, 5
February 2003, Chiefs of Staff meeting.
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