6.5 |
Planning and preparation for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, January to
March 2003
1053.
On 17 March,
at Ms Short’s request, DFID officials prepared a paper
on
shortcomings
in humanitarian preparations and steps needed to address the
situation.446
1054.
Ms Short sent
the paper to Mr Blair with the comment: “This summarises
what
needs to be
done to improve humanitarian preparedness. Perhaps we could really
focus
1055.
A No.10
official advised Mr Blair that the main problems identified by
DFID were:
•
underfunding
of humanitarian agencies;
•
agencies
not ready to respond effectively and lacking experience
outside
northern
Iraq;
•
the need
for Coalition forces to provide humanitarian assistance until there
was
a
permissive security environment; and
•
the risk
that OFF might break down.
1056.
The official
informed Mr Blair that DFID’s proposed solutions
included:
•
increased
funding for DFID and the MOD;
•
rapid
securing of a permissive security environment; and
•
a
resolution transferring management of OFF to the UN
Secretary-General.448
1057.
The official
assessed that the DFID analysis was “probably about right”.
The
MOD had
been pressing DFID to help for some weeks, so it was useful that
DFID now
recognised
the need to help. DFID was seconding two people to work with the US
and
the Cabinet
Office was working to broker a deal on additional funding with the
Treasury
(see
Section 13.1).
1058.
The official
recommended a meeting with Mr Brown, Mr Hoon,
Mr Straw and
Ms Short
to discuss humanitarian issues later in the week.
1059.
Mr Annan
told the press on 17 March that the UN would need a
Security
Council
mandate for some of the post-conflict activities it would have
to
undertake
in Iraq.
1060.
Mr Annan
spoke to the press after a meeting of the Security Council on 17
March:
“… if there
is military action, the [Security] Council of course will have to
meet to
discuss
what happens after all that. I think I have made it clear that
regardless
446
Minute
Conflict and Humanitarian Affairs Department [junior official] to
Private Secretary/Secretary of
State
[DFID], 17 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Humanitarian Assistance’ attaching
Paper [unattributed and undated],
‘Iraq: What
is lacking in terms of being prepared for an effective humanitarian
response and what would it
take to
address that?’
447
Manuscript
comment Short on Minute Conflict and Humanitarian Affairs
Department [junior official] to
Private
Secretary/Secretary of State [DFID], 17 March 2003, ‘Iraq:
Humanitarian Assistance’.
448
Minute
[No.10 junior official] to Prime Minister, 17 March 2003, ‘Iraq:
Humanitarian Assistance: DFID
Views’.
501