The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
1132.
On 5
December, the MOD sought Mr Blair’s agreement for further
and
visible
preparations to preserve its ability to be ready for an air
campaign and
amphibious
operations by early March.
1133.
In response to
the instructions issued during and after the Chiefs of
Staff
meeting on
27 November, Lt Gen Reith submitted a paper outlining
steps for aligning
the UK’s
Force Packages with US timelines, for consideration by the Chiefs
of Staff
on
4 December.444
He warned
that action was required or the UK might only be able
to
offer
Package 2, without the Amphibious Task Group; and that Package 3
might have to
be
reconfigured. Other preparatory action would be needed “if we do
not wish to miss
the boat”.
1134.
The Chiefs of
Staff noted on 4 December that decisions on visible
preparations
would be
required by 7 December to meet a mid‑February timetable for a
political
1135.
A member of OD
Sec reported to Sir David Manning that “it was clear
from
the
discussion” that the US was planning for “a hybrid (or ‘ugly’)
start to any military
campaign”.446
Gen Franks
was “moving as many assets into theatre as quickly as
is
logistically
possible, with a view to being in a position to launch military
action from the
middle of
February”.
1136.
Mr Watkins
wrote again to Sir David Manning on 5 December, setting out
what the
UK would
need to do to be able to react in the timescales implied by its
assessment of
1137.
Summarising
the letter, Mr Watkins wrote:
“… to keep
options open for significant UK military participation … we need
to
press ahead
with further preparations. None of these would constitute a
final
commitment
to military action and the initial ones can be done without
further
parliamentary
announcement. But many of them would be visible, and
our
presentational
posture will need to become more forward leaning.”
1138.
The US had “no
formal position on the date by which they must be ready to
act”.
It had a
wide range of options, but assuming that a political decision to
take military
action on
15 February (known as “P Day”), the MOD expected the air campaign
and
amphibious
operations to start in early March. The main ground effort would
commence
about 60
days after the decision, ie mid‑April. The US military intention
was to minimise
444
Minute CJO
to COSSEC, December 2002, ‘Operations in Iraq – Alignment with US
Timelines’.
445
Minutes, 4
December 2002, Chiefs of Staff meeting.
446
Minute OD
Sec [junior official] to David Manning, 4 December 2002, ‘Iraq:
Military Planning’.
447
Letter
Watkins to Manning, 5 December 2002, ‘Iraq: Military
Planning’.
346