Previous page | Contents | Next page
3.7  |  Development of UK strategy and options, 1 February to 7 March 2003
17.  In response, Mr Iain Duncan Smith, Leader of the Opposition, stated that his party
fully supported the UN route and he hoped a second resolution would be possible:
“Although it is not a prerequisite for future action, it is highly desirable.” He stated that
the “fundamental problem is not lack of time, but the attitude of Saddam Hussein”.
He agreed with Mr Blair that “if the international community backs away from dealing
with Saddam Hussein now, that will be seen as a green light by every rogue state and
terrorist group around the world”.
18.  Mr Charles Kennedy, Leader of the Liberal Democrats, referred to the extent of
public anxiety about developments and “a sense that we seem to be hastening into war
ahead of the events”. He stated that the Government had “still to make a credible case”,
and: “That case, for any fair-minded person viewing it, has to be based on credible
evidence, which has not so far been forthcoming.”
19.  Mr Blair responded that, after 12 years of trying to get disarmament, resolution
1441 offered Saddam Hussein a final opportunity. That was “hardly hastening into a
war”. It was a response to Saddam Hussein’s “point blank” refusal to do what the United
Nations had asked. If, as Dr Blix had said, Saddam Hussein was “carrying on in breach
of his obligations, that was “credible evidence” that he was not co-operating. The United
Nations had decided that Saddam Hussein was in breach of its resolutions and he had
“got to produce the evidence that he is now co-operating fully – and he is not doing so”.
20.  Mr Blair added that the inspectors’ task was “not to engage in an elaborate game
of hide and seek”. That was the game Saddam Hussein had been playing for 12 years;
and it was “unacceptable”. The US had chosen to go through the UN process, “but that
process should be a way of dealing with this issue once and for all, not of kicking it into
the long grass again and avoiding it altogether”.
21.  In response to a question from Mr Donald Anderson, Chairman of the Foreign
Affairs Committee (FAC), about whether he feared that Russia, France or China might
“unreasonably” veto a second resolution, Mr Blair responded that he was:
“… working on the basis that people hold to both the spirit and the letter of resolution
1441. The process has integrity. Saddam has a final opportunity and he must
co-operate fully. If he does not, a fresh resolution will be issued. The logic of that
will take people along with us, especially when there are further inspectors’ reports
to come.”
22.  Asked by Mr David Heath (Liberal Democrat) whether he disagreed with a view that
war would be a potent recruiting tool for terrorist groups, Mr Blair responded: “If we are
taking action where we are obviously and clearly enforcing the will of the UN”, that view
was “not right”.
183
Previous page | Contents | Next page