7 | Conclusions: Pre-conflict strategy and planning

249. Mr Blair told Cabinet on 13 March that work continued in the UN to obtain

a second resolution and, following the French decision to veto, the outcome

remained open.121

250. Mr Straw described President Chirac’s position as “irresponsible”.

251. Mr Straw told Cabinet that there was “good progress” in gaining support

in the Security Council.

252. Mr Blair concluded that the French position “looked to be based on a calculation

of strategic benefit”. It was “in contradiction of the Security Council’s earlier view that

military action would follow if Iraq did not fully and unconditionally co-operate with the

inspectors”. The UK would “continue to show flexibility” in its efforts to achieve a second

resolution and, “if France could be shown to be intransigent, the mood of the Security

Council could change towards support for the British draft”.

253. Mr Blair agreed the military plan later on 13 March.122

254. On 13 March, Mr Blair and President Bush discussed withdrawing the

resolution on 17 March followed by a US ultimatum to Saddam Hussein to leave

within 48 hours. There would be no US military action until after the vote in the

House of Commons on 18 March.123

255. Mr Blair continued to press President Bush to publish the Road Map on the

Middle East Peace Process because of its impact on domestic opinion in the UK

as well as its strategic impact.

256. Reporting developments in New York on 13 March, Sir Jeremy Greenstock warned

that the UK tests had attracted no support, and that the US might be ready to call a halt

to the UN process on 15 March.124 The main objections had included the “perceived

authorisation of force in the draft resolution” and a desire to wait for UNMOVIC’s own list

of key tasks which would be issued early the following week.

257. President Chirac told Mr Blair on 14 March that France was “content to proceed

‘in the logic of UNSCR 1441’; but it could not accept an ultimatum or any ‘automaticity’

of recourse to force”.125 He proposed looking at a new resolution in line with resolution

1441, “provided that it excluded these options”. President Chirac “suggested that the

UNMOVIC work programme might provide a way forward. France was prepared to look

at reducing the 120 day timeframe it envisaged.”

121 Cabinet Conclusions, 13 March 2003.

122 Letter Rycroft to Watkins, 13 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Military Planning’.

123 Letter Cannon to McDonald, 13 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Military Timetable’.

124 Telegram 438 UKMIS New York to FCO London, 14 March 2003, ‘Iraq: 13 March’.

125 Letter Cannon to Owen, 14 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s Conversation with President Chirac,

14 March’.

603