The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

540. During his visit to Baghdad in early August to assess implementation of the work

schedule agreed in June, Mr Butler had also proposed to address substantive issues

outside the agreed work programme, including VX, concealment and the implications

of the document found on 18 July, and to propose a further programme of intensive

work “directed at bringing [the] remaining issues in the missile and chemical weapons

areas to closure” before UNSCOM’s next report to the Security Council in October.218

541. Mr Aziz had rejected both proposals and “insisted” that he should immediately

report to the Security Council that “there were no more proscribed weapons and [related]

materials in Iraq”.

542. Mr Aziz also stated that Iraq would “never” give UNSCOM the document found

on 18 July and, since Mr Butler was not prepared to report immediately that Iraq was

in compliance with its obligations, engaging further with the programme would be

“useless”. As a result, the discussions were terminated. Mr Butler reported:

“Under the circumstances, I judged that the best course of action was to report

immediately to the Council.”

543. Mr Annan wrote that Iraq had “clearly taken a strategic decision to force the issue”,

demanding that UNSCOM should report Iraq had fully disarmed or lose the regime’s

co‑operation.219

544. Mr Annan added that Mr Butler was:

“… of course … not able to do this – but his position had been weakened further by

increasing allegations, including from within UNSCOM itself, that the mission had

been used by national intelligence agencies for information gathering un-related to

its disarmament mission. The Iraqis seized on this and won support from Russia in

denouncing UNSCOM, and Butler in particular as untrustworthy.”

545. On 5 August, the Revolutionary Command Council and the Iraqi Regional

Command of the Arab Ba’ath Socialist Party issued a statement recording the decision

to suspend “co-operation with the Special Commission in its current form” and with

the IAEA.220

546. The decision also:

• called on the Security Council to apply paragraph 22 of resolution 687 “as a first

step on the road leading to the complete and total lifting of sanctions”;

218 UN Security Council, 5 August 1998, ‘Letter dated 5 August 1998 from the Executive Chairman of the

Special Commission established by the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 9 (b) (i) of Security

Council resolution 687 (1991) addressed to the President of the Security Council’ (S/1998/719).

219 Annan K. Interventions: A Life In War And Peace. Allen Lane, 2012.

220 UN Security Council, 14 August 1998, ‘Statement issued by the Revolution Command Council and the

Iraqi Regional Command of the Arab Ba’ath Socialist Party’ (S/1998/718).

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