The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
332.
Addressing
points raised by policy departments, including in relation to
Iraq,
Mr Scarlett
wrote that:
•
In the
context of Mr Straw’s comment that an earlier draft did not
demonstrate
why Iraq
posed a greater threat than other countries of concern, the new
draft
highlighted
“some unique features” in relation to Iraq’s violation of
Security
Council
resolutions and Saddam Hussein’s use of CW agents against
his
own people.
•
Sir David
might wish to consider whether the paper could achieve more
impact
if it “only
covered Iraq”: “This would have the benefit of obscuring the fact
that in
terms of
WMD, Iraq is not that exceptional. But it would diminish the impact
of
the paper
in terms of the wider problem of WMD proliferation.”
•
There was a
“potential for some awkwardness” because the briefing
document
circulated
to the PLP in early March stated that Iraq could have nuclear
weapons
in five
years if its programmes remained unchecked.
333.
Mr Scarlett
also drew attention to the implications of making public for the
first time
the UK’s
assessments of Iran and Libya’s nuclear and chemical programmes,
and the
omission of
Syria because it was “not expected to develop capabilities
threatening to
western
interests (no long-range missiles)” and it was “not clear” if it
was “pursuing a
nuclear
programme”.
334.
Mr Scarlett
suggested that Sir David might want to consider a wider
discussion
of the
issues raised, and advised that it would be important to set the
paper “in a wider
policy
context” and prepare defensive press material before it was
released.
335.
Mr Scarlett
also mentioned a separate paper, on the world trade in
WMD
commissioned
by Mr Campbell, which “might be more effective as an appendix”
to
the paper
on WMD programmes of concern. That could be considered when a
more
developed
text was available.
336.
There is no
evidence that Sir David sought a wider discussion.
337.
Changes to the
draft included:
•
A revision
to the Aim to state that the paper focused “on four countries,
whose
activities
are assessed to pose a direct threat to our
interests”.
•
Saddam
Hussein’s “demonstrated readiness to deploy extensively WMD in
the
form of
chemical weapons both against his neighbours and his own
population”
before the
Gulf Conflict.
•
Reference
to Iraq’s failure to comply with UN Security Council
resolutions.
•
The
statement that recent evidence indicated Iraq had succeeded in
reverse
engineering
SCUD missiles was amended to “may have succeeded”.
•
Addition of
a reference to the IAEA having dismantled Iraq’s nuclear
weapons
infrastructure,
and the removal of a reference to a judgement that Iraq
still
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