The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
110.
The Ad Hoc
Ministerial Group on Iraq Rehabilitation (AHMGIR – see box
later
in this
Section) discussed an IPU paper on SSR on 8 May.83
No Home
Office Minister
was available
to attend the meeting but Lord Goldsmith, the Attorney General,
did
attend. In
advance of the meeting Mr Blunkett spoke to Lord Goldsmith and
confirmed
the
Home Office’s willingness to contribute resources and
expertise to assist UK efforts
to shape
SSR work in Iraq. They agreed that it would be useful for their two
departments
to work
together on the matter.
111.
The Home
Office recognised that its potentially relevant expertise covered a
range
of areas,
including terrorism and security, immigration and asylum, drugs,
policing
and prisons.
112.
Lord Goldsmith
reported to the AHMGIR that he and Mr Blunkett were willing
to
put more
resources into helping the police and justice work in
Iraq.84
113.
CC Kernaghan
visited Iraq in late May.85
In his visit
report he observed: “Effective
policing in
Iraq requires operational officers to be armed.” Given that, and
the fact that
the vast
majority of police officers in the UK did not routinely carry
firearms and so were
not trained
in their use, he did not believe that they would be effective in an
operational
role in
Iraq.
114.
CC Kernaghan
thought that UK involvement in police training would be
more
appropriate.
He commented that the pressure to deploy police officers on
operational
duties was
likely to be immense.
115.
Following an
agreement for the UK to provide a Chief Constable to be the
senior
policing
adviser to the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) within the
Iraqi Ministry
of Interior
(MOI), on 6 June 2003 ACPO issued a notice advertising a
secondment
opportunity
for a senior UK police officer.86
116.
The progress
of the Coalition invasion of Iraq is described in detail in Section
8,
and the
events that followed it in Section 9.1. The start of efforts to
reconstruct Iraq is set
out in
Section 10.1.
117.
Shortly after
the start of Operation TELIC,87
the IPU
circulated a “core script” on
Phase IV
issues from which Ministers and officials could draw as
Parliamentary and
83
Minute
Acton to Riley, 7 May 2003, ‘Iraq – Security Sector
Reform’.
84
Minutes, 8
May 2003, Ad Hoc Group on Iraq Rehabilitation meeting.
85
Letter
Kernaghan to Blunkett, 23 May 2003, ‘Iraq – Visit by Chief
Constable P R Kernaghan’
attaching Report
Kernaghan, 10 May 2003, ‘Report on Visit to Iraq by Chief Constable
Kernaghan
[13‑20 May
2003]’.
86
Statement
White, 20 June 2010, page 2.
87
Operation
TELIC was the codename for the involvement of UK Armed Forces in
the military campaign
to remove
the threat from Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction.
88