6.4 |
Planning and preparation for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, mid-2001
to January 2003
information
on Iraq’s capacity to respond to the disruption of basic
services.354
Removal
of
“restrictions on initiating contact with relevant stakeholders”
would allow DFID to fill
the gap and
develop a fuller picture of humanitarian agencies’ contingency
planning and
regional
capacity.
718.
The Cabinet
Office record of the meeting of the AHGI on 11 October observed
that
the DFID
paper assumed there would be substantial UN involvement in
post-conflict Iraq
and
added:
“We have
asked DFID not to discuss post-conflict Iraq humanitarian issues
with [the]
UN system
yet, but they will need to do so to develop planning
further.”355
719.
On 18 October,
Mr Drummond informed Sir David Manning that
departments’
contingency
planning was mostly confined to Whitehall.356
Although
there was no
immediate
pressure to extend existing external contacts, which included DTI
contacts
with the
oil industry, the police with community leaders, and the FCO with
the US,
France and
Germany, “some Departments such as DFID, who would like to link up
with
UN
contingency planning, would find it helpful to be authorised to
make contact soon,
perhaps
after the UNSCR is agreed”.
720.
On 30
September, Mr Chakrabarti had called on Mr Elliot Abrams, Head of
the
US
inter-agency Humanitarian Working Group.357
Mr Abrams
outlined US thinking and
suggested
the UK and US keep in touch.
721.
On 9 October,
Mr Chakrabarti asked Mr Fernie to visit Washington in
early
November
“for discussions with all the parts of the US Admin[istration] and
with
the World
Bank”.358
He added
that DFID needed to “thicken up our humanitarian/
development
approach to Iraq”.
722.
On 15 October,
Ms Anna Bewes, Ms Short’s Principal Private Secretary,
informed
Ms Carolyn
Miller, DFID Director Middle East and North Africa, that Ms Short
had
seen the
record of Mr Chakrabarti’s visit and agreed DFID should be planning
for all
humanitarian
contingencies, including those not involving military action, but
was “very
wary” of
attracting any publicity:
“It could
cause huge political difficulties if it emerged that … DFID is
planning for
war. For
this reason the Secretary of State has asked me to make it clear
that
she does
not authorise any discussion or document sharing with the US on
our
preparations
for humanitarian crises in Iraq.”359
354
Paper DFID,
11 October 2002, ‘Iraq: Potential Humanitarian
Implications’.
355
Minute Dodd
to Manning, 14 October 2002, ‘Ad Hoc Group on Iraq’.
356
Minute
Drummond to Manning, 18 October 2002, ‘Iraq: Contingency
Plans’.
357
Minute
[DFID junior official] to Chakrabarti, 9 October 2002, ‘Call on
Elliot Abrams, Special Assistant
to the
President & Senior Director for Democracy, Human Rights &
International Operations,
30 September:
Iraq’.
358
Email
Chakrabarti to Brewer/Fernie/Miller, 9 October 2002, ‘Note on Call
on Elliot Abrams’.
359
Email Bewes
to Miller, 15 October 2002, ‘Iraq’.
233