3.4 |
Development of UK strategy and options, late July to 14 September
2002
no
decisions have been taken. So the arguments are all being made
against any
action,
when we are not yet in a position to make the arguments for it. But
all this
can be
turned round in time, with the right strategy.
“My basic
view on Iraq is clear and hard. The policy of containment … has
worked
up to a
point, but can’t continue indefinitely; there is no doubt that,
uncontained,
Iraq is a
threat; they are trying to acquire nuclear weapons capability; they
are
developing
ballistic missile capability for biological and chemical weapons of
a
longer
range; they retain substantial WMD stocks; the regime is deeply
repugnant,
corrupt and
repressive … The region, the world, the Iraqi people would be
better off
without
Saddam.
“Opinion
against action divides into two: those always opposed and the
usual
anti‑American
lobby; and those, a large number, who ask entirely
sensible
questions,
but who might support action if the questions were
answered.”71
215.
Mr Blair
stated: “The basic strategy should be to answer these questions
and,
in doing
so, set … Iraq in a bigger context.” The steps to do that
were:
•
Raising the
whole issue of WMD up the agenda with a separate
strategy
for each
country developing WMD, “in particular [those] acquiring
nuclear
technology
in secret”.
•
Setting out
the “unique danger posed by Iraq … an inherently violent
and
unstable
regime, with a track record of external aggression, unmitigated by
any
moderate
elements unlike other WMD countries”.
•
Exposing
and highlighting the “limits of the policy of
containment”.
•
A strategy
which “should be to work towards a new UN resolution on
weapons
inspections,
effectively becoming an ultimatum to Saddam. But it must
be
unconditional
access and change to the way the regime operates viz its
military
capability.
It will be clear that refusal or non‑compliance will not be a
subject
of
negotiation but action. We need to begin the diplomatic work on
this now.
Russia and
my visit to Putin [Russian President, Mr Vladimir Putin] in
October
will be
crucial. Obviously – and this is the legitimate US worry – if we go
the UN
route,
Saddam may yield, agree and then play about. We need to be very
clear
we won’t
let that happen. But it does mean that conflict is dependent on
the
regime’s
response, not inevitable, though I don’t think it will be long
before his
true
intention is clear.”
•
Building EU
and Arab support for action “if the UN route does not deliver, ie
we
say … we
will try the UN route; but doing nothing is not an
option”.
•
Working
“strenuously to put together a new MEPP process. This is the key
to
Arab
opinion …”
71
Note Blair
[to No.10 officials], 30 August 2002, [extract
‘Iraq’].
131