The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
headquarters
and one of the three brigades, and we would like to make up
the
remaining
two brigades through contributions from other
nations.”
97.
The FCO
instructions were sent to UK Defence Attachés along with detailed
MOD
instructions
on the specific contributions sought.
98.
The same day,
the US Embassy London expressed concern to the FCO that
the
UK’s
lobbying campaign had not been co-ordinated with the
US.72
Countries
would be
offering
the same assets to the US and UK.
99.
On 11 April,
Mr Peter Gooderham, Political Counsellor at the British
Embassy
Washington,
reported that he had told the US that the UK had kept it informed
at every
stage and
could not be expected “to wait around while they get their
inter-agency act
together”.73
Mr Gooderham
had declined a US request to “abort” the lobbying
telegram.
100.
Later that
day, Mr Gooderham reported that while there was still
“consternation”
in the
US State Department, he had managed to calm the
situation.74
101.
Mr Watkins
informed No.10 on 23 April that there were “encouraging
signs
of interest
from potential Coalition partners”, including Italy, which had
secured
parliamentary
approval for deployment of a brigade headquarters, one
battalion,
400‑500
Carabinieri and a number of specialist
capabilities.75
102.
Taken
together, offers of contributions provided a promising basis for a
UK-led
multilateral
division and might produce some surplus capability. Multilateral
meetings
were
scheduled on 30 April and 8 May to take things
forward.
103.
In parallel,
senior FCO officials sought to engage the European Union (EU)
and
EU Member
States on post-conflict issues.
104.
The Presidency
Conclusions of the European Council on 20 and 21 March
stated that
the EU was committed to being “actively involved” in addressing
Iraq’s
humanitarian
needs and that it wanted effectively to “contribute to the
conditions
allowing all
Iraqis to live in freedom, dignity and prosperity under a
representative
government”.76
The
European Council invited the European Commission and
High
Representative
“to explore the means by which the EU might help the Iraqi
people
to achieve
these objectives”.
105.
Sir Nigel
Sheinwald, UK Permanent Representative to the EU, interpreted
the
European
Council Conclusions as evidence that the EU “was shaping up
the right
72
Email FCO
[junior official] to FCO Emergency Unit, 10 April 2003, ‘US Embassy
Interest in Phase IV’.
73
Email
Gooderham to FCO Emergency Unit, 11 April 2003, ‘US Embassy
Interest in Phase IV’.
74
Email FCO
Emergency Unit [junior official] to Ehrman, 11 April 2003, ‘Phase
IV: Next Steps’.
75
Letter
Watkins to Cannon, 23 April 2003, ‘Iraq: Phase IV Contributions and
Coalition-building’.
76
European
Commission, Press Release, 21 March 2003, Brussels
European Council 20 and 21 March
2003
Presidency Conclusions.
20