The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
16 battalions
busy. Basra province (the most likely UK AOR) has a population
of
about two
million.”
553.
Mr Chilcott
reported that (acting) Maj Gen Whitley needed guidance from
London
on the size
of the UK commitment to Phase IV. He added that, at the Chiefs of
Staff
Committee
on 19 February, Adm Boyce:
“… thought
we should aim to reduce to a medium size (ie one brigade) within
six
months and
then stay at that level for as long as necessary.238
Provided we
can
attract
suitable partners to join us (and that would almost certainly
depend on having
UNSCR
authorisation for Phase IV), having a UK two-star in charge of one
of the
sectors
would be a reasonable outcome.”
554.
Mr Chilcott
explained that ORHA would organise into three sectors – north,
central
and south,
aligned with military sectors containing “very large numbers of
people”. For
as long as
ORHA had no UN mandate, its work would be politically controversial
and
was “likely
to be very messy”. Mr Chilcott advised against accepting an
expected offer
from Lt Gen
Garner for Maj Gen Cross to lead one of the three
sectors.
555.
It is not
clear who saw Mr Chilcott’s paper, but some of the issues
raised were
discussed
at a meeting chaired by Mr Blair on 6 March.
556.
Lord Boyce
told the Inquiry:
“… the
initial expectation was that we would be there for a while, without
defining
exactly
what it was. But we certainly weren’t expecting, the day after
achieving
success, to
start drawing down our numbers; we were expecting to be there
for
a considerable
period of time.”239
557.
Lord Boyce
explained: “I thought we would be there for three or four years at
least,
and said so
at the time.” He added:
“The
theoretical planning against the defence planning assumptions is
you don’t
do this
sort of operation for an extended period longer than about six
months. But
it never
seemed to me very likely that we would be out [of] there in six
months.”
558.
Mr Blair’s
Note to President Bush on the second resolution, sent
on
19 February,
said little about post-conflict issues.
559.
There is no
indication that, when Mr Blair discussed Iraq with President
Bush
on 19
February, he raised either post-conflict planning or the
post-conflict role of
the
UN.
238
The minutes
of the Chiefs of Staff meeting, quoted earlier in this Section,
recorded Adm Boyce as
saying only
that the UK military commitment should be “scaled down from large
to medium in the autumn”.
239
Public
hearing, 3 December 2009, page 101.
408