15.1 | Civilian
personnel
720.
The paper also
stated that the MOD arranged its own training and
briefing.
For recent
deployments, that had matched the FCO arrangements, although MOD
staff
continued
to receive NBC training.
721.
DFID training
followed the same principles, but was provided by the private
sector
because
those courses were more frequent.
722.
The paper
stated that debriefing of secondees on their return from Iraq
indicated
that they
received good preparation “now that some deficiencies in the
Chilwell
course …
have been dealt with”. Feedback from staff still in Iraq “confirms
that the
training
has been useful and appropriate”.
723.
Concerns about
the Chilwell course resurfaced in the MOD in 2005. After
visiting
Iraq in
April 2005, Mr Hatfield reported that the course did not seem
to be working:
“Apart from
the cultural brief, hardly a good word was said about it. To be
fair, it was
not
designed for civil servants. As a result of my discussions with our
Ambassador
[Mr Chaplin],
I think the solution might be to join with the FCO who have their
own
preparatory
course.”
724.
In June 2006,
the MOD established the Support to Operations (S2O)
programme
in response
to lessons learned from the deployment of civilians on Op
TELIC.466
The
programme’s
aim was “to develop a more capable deployable civilian workforce,
to
reduce the
risk to deployed civilian staff and to ensure MOD is meeting its
duty of care
to those
deployed”.
725.
S2O was
designed as a “single portal” for all deployed civil servants and
visitors to
operations,
to ensure they had been adequately trained, were medically fit and
had the
appropriate
equipment before deployment.467
726.
The MOD told
the Inquiry that S2O oversaw both pre‑ and
post‑deployment
processes,
with much emphasis on the support to families.468
727.
Mr Martin
Howard, MOD Director General Operational Policy, visited Basra
and
Baghdad
from 17 to 20 January 2007.469
He reported
to Vice Admiral Charles Style,
DCDS(C),
that the MOD POLAD team in Basra and the MOD training team in
Baghdad
were in
“good spirits” and found their roles challenging and interesting,
but felt that:
•
pre‑deployment
training and briefing were not adequate;
•
their
accommodation and support package was not comparable to that
received
by FCO and
DFID staff;
•
succession
planning was not adequate; and
466
Paper
Support to Operations, 23 November 2007, ‘Project Management
Plan’.
467
Minute
[unattributed] to PS/PUS [MOD], 4 December 2007, ‘TELIC Visit –
Support to Operations Brief’.
468
Paper
[unattributed and undated], ‘MOD Operational Deployment Frameworks
for MOD Civilians for the
period
2003‑2009’.
469
Minute DG
OP POL/IRAQ to DCDS(C), 26 January 2007, ‘DG OP POL’s Iraq Visit
Report’.
367