7 |
Conclusions: Pre-conflict strategy and planning
121.
The UK was
successful in changing some aspects of the US position during
the
negotiations,
in particular ensuring that the Security Council resolution was
based on
the disarmament
of Iraq rather than wider issues as originally proposed by the
US.
122.
To secure
consensus in the Security Council despite the different positions
of the
US and
France and Russia (described by Sir Jeremy Greenstock, the UK
Permanent
Representative
to the UN in New York, as “irreconcilable”), resolution 1441 was
a
compromise
containing drafting “fixes”. That created deliberate ambiguities on
a number
of key
issues including:
•
the level
of non-compliance with resolution 1441 which would
constitute
a material
breach;
•
by whom
that determination would be made; and
•
whether
there would be a second resolution explicitly authorising the
use
of force.
123.
As the
Explanations of Vote demonstrated, there were significant
differences
between the
positions of the members of the Security Council about the
circumstances
and timing
of recourse to military action. There were also differences about
whether
Member
States should be entitled to report Iraqi non-compliance to the
Council.
124.
Mr Blair,
Mr Straw and other senior UK participants in the negotiation
of resolution
1441
envisaged that, in the event of a material breach of Iraq’s
obligations, a second
resolution
determining that a breach existed and authorising the use of force
was likely
to be
tabled in the Security Council.
125.
Iraq announced
on 13 November that it would comply with resolution
1441.43
126.
Iraq also
re-stated its position that it had neither produced nor was in
possession
of weapons
of mass destruction since the inspectors left in December 1998. It
explicitly
challenged
the UK statement on 8 November that Iraq had decided to keep
possession
of its
WMD.
127.
Following
Iraq’s submission of the declaration on its chemical, biological,
nuclear
and
ballistic missile programmes to the UN on 7 December, and
before the inspectors
had
properly begun their task, the US concluded that Saddam Hussein was
not going
to take
the final opportunity offered by resolution 1441 to comply with his
obligations.
128.
Mr Blair
was advised on 11 December that there was impatience in the
US
Administration
and it was looking at military action as early as mid-February
2003.44
43
UN Security
Council, 13 November 2002, ‘Letter dated 13 November 2002
from the Minister for Foreign
Affairs of
Iraq addressed to the Secretary-General’
(S/2002/1242).
44
Minute
Manning to Prime Minister, 11 December 2002,
‘Iraq’.
587