9.6 |
27 June 2007 to April 2008
engage in
direct contact with representatives of the coalition was likely to
continue “at
least so
long as there is no timetable for MNF withdrawal”.
73.
The JIC’s Key
Judgements included:
“I. Muqtada
al-Sadr’s leadership of his movement will not face serious
challenge:
he has no
obvious successor. But his followers are likely to remain
fractious: deep
seated
animosities have been managed rather than resolved. As a political
force,
Sadrism
will probably not survive Sadr himself: …
…
“III.
Backed by his Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) militia, Sadr continues to
exercise
considerable
political clout in Baghdad and across large parts of the South.
His
relations
with Prime Minister Maliki have soured. Although withdrawing
from
government,
Sadr wishes to remain politically engaged … Sadr, like others,
is
positioning
himself to benefit from any change of Prime Minister.
“IV. Sadr’s
relationship with other Shia political figures is equally fraught.
Rivalry
is
particularly intense with ISCI [Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq],
reinforced by
a long
standing dynastic feud. But neither side appears willing yet to
risk Shia
unity by
forming an alternative alliance. ISCI and others in the Shia United
Iraqi
Alliance
(UIA) are also nervous of Sadr’s ability to mobilise mass support
to general
widespread
disorder.
…
“VI. Sadr
uses violence as a political tool. He probably also has to accept
some
JAM
violence to maintain its cohesion and his popular support. However,
Sadr will
try to
calibrate anti-coalition attacks and prevent any return to
large-scale sectarian
conflict.
To date he has intervened quickly to prevent intra-Shia violence
from
escalating:
if he cannot prevent it, he will try to exploit it.”
74.
The JIC judged
that al-Sadr’s relationship with Iran was “complex”, he had
“spent
much of
this year in hiding in Iran”, but he and the Iranians were “likely
to remain
uncomfortable
partners”.
75.
The JIC
assessed that al-Sadr was also motivated by “a genuine desire to
see
improvements
in the quality of life for his core constituency among Iraq’s Shia
poor”.
Popular
appeal would make the Sadrists well placed to take seats on local
councils in
future
provincial elections, in which they would be participating for the
first time. The JIC
assessed
that JAM would be used to intimidate the Sadrists’ rivals and the
electorate.
197