The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
561.
Summing up the
discussion, Mr Blair said:
“… the
strategy based on the United Nations route was clear, although
the
uncertainties
loomed large and there was a natural reluctance to go to war. It
was
to be
expected that the public would want the inspectors to find the
evidence before
military
action was taken. Pursuing the United Nations route was the right
policy, but
we should
not rule out the possibility of military action without a second
resolution.
The
priorities for the immediate future were:
•
improved
communications, which would set out the Government’s strategy
and
be promoted
by the whole Cabinet;
•
preparatory
work on planning the aftermath of any military action and the role
of
the United
Nations in that, which should in turn be conveyed to the Iraqi
people
so that
they had a vision of a better life in prospect; and
•
contingency
work on the unintended consequences which could arise
from
the Iraqi
use of weapons of mass destruction, environmental catastrophe
or
internecine
strife within Iraq.”
562.
Mr Campbell
wrote that Cabinet was “fine”. In addition to the points
recorded
in the minutes,
Mr Campbell wrote that Mr Blair had said
that:
•
Russia was
“closer to the Americans” than it said publicly and France
did
“not particularly
want to be left on the outside”: “But it was going to be
tough.”
•
“In the
meantime we build up our troops, and make sure that if it does
come
to conflict
we are able to get it over quickly.”
•
“… we had
to stay close [to the US] publicly to maximise influence
privately.”187
563.
Mr Campbell
also wrote:
•
Mr Cook
had said that “we were in a tremendous position in the UN”, thanks
to
Mr Blair.
The prospect of getting a second resolution was stronger if we did
not
rule out
doing without one.
•
Mr John
Prescott, the Deputy Prime Minister and Deputy Leader of the
Labour
Party, had
“done a very passionate wind‑up”; the “discussion showed that
there
was no real
division ‘so let’s stop pretending there is”. The briefings had to
stop.
The
[Labour] Party didn’t “like the idea of intervention but sometimes
we have
to make
difficult judgements”.
564.
The
discussion at Cabinet on 16 January took place at a key point in
the
development
of the UK’s position on Iraq and focused primarily on the role
of
inspections,
forthcoming diplomatic activity at the UN, the need for
effective
communication
of the Government’s position, and a high level discussion
of
some of
the possible consequences of military action.
187
Campbell A
& Hagerty B. The
Alastair Campbell Diaries. Volume 4. The Burden of Power:
Countdown
to
Iraq. Hutchinson,
2012.
100