The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
1018.
Should the
collapse occur after 60 days, the UK land component would be at
full
operating
capability and would deal with the situation.
1019.
In order to
provide a quick response, the stabilisation force was “likely to be
light”
and its
role limited to “wider peacekeeping and ‘stabilisation’ tasks”,
including controlling
and denying
access to WMD, security at key locations, disarmament and
demobilisation.
The
proposal set out a number of options for different
scenarios.
1020.
The Chiefs of
Staff discussed the paper on 18 December.489
At the
meeting,
Lt Gen
Reith commented that any stabilisation force would depend on timing
and
availability
of resources, and that there was a synergy between the southern
option
and a
stabilisation force.
1021.
On 19
December, Mr Hoon’s Private Office informed Sir David Manning
and
the FCO,
Treasury and Cabinet Office that the US military was “gearing up”
to be as
ready as
possible by 15 February, and advised: “we may well have to advance
aspects
of our own
preparations if we are to remain in step”.490
The US now
recognised that
stabilisation
and reconstruction of up to two thirds of Iraq would need to begin
before the
military
campaign had concluded. This was “bringing home to the US military
the need
for more
planning effort to be devoted to ‘aftermath’ issues
now”.
1022.
The letter was
not sent to DFID.
1023.
The
information on US planning in the letter from Mr Hoon’s Private
Office was
repeated in
a paper on US military thinking included in the Christmas reading
pack sent
to Mr Blair
on 20 December.491
1024.
Mr Watkins’
covering letter to Sir David Manning highlighted “an
increasingly
pressing
need to satisfy ourselves that the US has an overarching political
strategy with
which the
Government is content” and “to address soon our campaign
objectives”, but
made no
reference to post-conflict planning.
1025.
In January
2003, Mr Blair decided to publish the UK’s strategic
policy
objectives
for Iraq. They were closely based on those he had agreed
in
October
2002.
1026.
Mr Straw
issued a Written Ministerial Statement setting out the
UK’s
objectives
in Parliament on 7 January.
1027.
Publication
of the objectives is addressed in more detail in Section
3.6.
489
Minutes, 18
December 2002, Chiefs of Staff meeting.
490
Letter
Williams to Manning, 19 December 2002, ‘Iraq: Evolving US Military
Thinking’.
491
Letter
Watkins to Manning, 20 December 2002, ‘Iraq: Christmas
Reading’.
286