The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
mainly
through them, British officers and officials seconded to the
Pentagon and
CENTCOM.
“The main
purpose of the unit will be to provide policy guidance on the
practical
questions
that British civilian officials and military commanders will face,
in the
event of a
conflict in Iraq. The advice will be designed to help them to
minimise the
suffering
of the Iraqi people and to deal with the civil administration of
any sector
of Iraq
under the control of British forces, particularly during the period
before a
transitional
civilian administration is established. It will aim to ensure that
British
operational
military planning for the post-conflict phase in Iraq is consistent
with
and
promotes the UK’s policy objectives on the future of Iraq. In doing
so it will
take particular
account of the key role of the UN.
“The unit
will aim to bring influence to bear on US plans by providing
similar
guidance,
through PJHQ and MOD, to seconded British personnel working
within
the US
military planning machinery and through the Embassy to the NSC and
other
parts of
the US Administration.
“The unit
will also provide a focus in Whitehall for developing policy
advice
and recommendations,
as required, on strategic questions concerning a post
Saddam
Iraq.
“The role
of the unit will be reviewed in three months.”122
252.
The record of
the 17 February meeting of the AHGI stated that the US and
UK
military
build-up continued and the US “impetus to war” had not
slowed.123
The IPU
had
been formed
initially “to meet a UK military planning need for detailed policy
guidance on
occupation
issues”. In the event of UK participation in the occupation of Iraq
it was likely
to expand
considerably.
253.
The record
continued:
“We need to
agree with the US on the role of the UN in any civilian
transitional
administration.
We see advantage in a major UN role for reasons of
legitimacy,
expertise
in certain areas and burden-sharing. However, in exchange for
sanctioning
a
transitional administration, the UN Security Council may require a
larger UN role
than the US
currently envisage.
“Our
original planning envisaged a period of up to three months of
military rule.
Latest
reports from CENTCOM suggest the US envisage moving to civilian
rule
more
quickly …
122
Letter Jay
to Turnbull, 17 February 2003, ‘Iraq Planning Unit’ attaching Paper
[unattributed and
undated],
‘Proposed Terms of Reference for the tract [sic] Planning
Unit’.
123
Minute Dodd
to Manning, 17 February 2003, ‘Ad Hoc Group on Iraq’.
354