The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
283.
However, that
positive assessment was tempered by concern about the state
of
the
economy:
“… scratch
the surface and the scale of the challenges that lie ahead
becomes
apparent …
the issues raised by the locals I spoke to cause me some
concern:
jobs,
electricity, rubbish and jobs again – I see only limited progress
in any of
these
areas. We must do all that we can to generate employment and
encourage
Iraq’s
neighbours to invest in the potentially rich South. We must not
over-sell the
outstanding
work that has been done.”
284.
Looking to the
longer term, Gen Dannatt reported that he did not support
any
residual
Army commitment in the South of Iraq once UK troops had been
extracted.
Rather, the
Army should plan to provide the lead for the NATO training mission
in
Baghdad,
“though I am not convinced we fully understand the potential
totality of this
task,
particularly in terms of FP [force protection] and life
support”.
285.
Gen Odierno
had been “generous enough to suggest” that, once the US
merged
the MNF-I,
MNC-I and MNSTC-I commands in early 2010, the UK should provide
one
of the
three-star Deputy Commander posts. Gen Dannatt’s view, given the
UK’s overall
commitment
and the focus of the training mission, was that a two-star post
would be
more
appropriate.
286.
Mr Brown
told Cabinet on 16 December that, following delicate discussions,
the
UK had
agreed with Prime Minister Maliki arrangements that would give
legal protection
for UK
troops in Iraq after the expiry of resolution 1790 at the end of
the year.109
The
law
would be
put to the Council of Representatives shortly.
287.
Mr Brown
noted progress on the four key tasks – training Iraqi forces,
restoring
local
government, handing over Basra international airport and economic
development.
He urged
further efforts over the next few months to complete these tasks
and allow the
drawdown of
troops to begin in May, a timetable agreed with the Iraqi
Government that
suited UK
forces. The UK would leave Iraq “with pride, having successfully
completed
our
tasks”.
288.
In discussion,
members of Cabinet observed that although negotiations were
not
complete,
the “risk of premature departure” was reduced. ACM Stirrup had
advised that
the outcome
was “acceptable, if not perfect”.
289.
Mr Hutton
wrote to Mr Brown on 16 December to report that the MOD and
FCO
team in
Baghdad had finalised negotiations with its Iraqi counterparts on a
draft law
providing
UK forces with the necessary jurisdictional immunities, and was
nearing
agreement
on a Government to Government Exchange of Letters.110
109
Cabinet
Conclusions, 16 December 2008.
110
Letter
Hutton to Brown, 16 December 2008, ‘Iraq: Legal Arrangements in
2009’.
428