12.1 |
Security Sector Reform
The Iraq
Planning Unit (IPU) was established on 10 February with
Mr Dominick Chilcott,
FCO Middle
East Department as its head. Its remit was “to develop policy
guidance
to enable
the administration of Iraq pending the appointment of a
transitional civil
administration,
consistent as far as possible with the longer‑term vision for the
future
of Iraq”.39
Mr Bowen,
defining the purpose of the Unit, wrote:
“They would
need to work their way, with the US, through issues as diverse
as
humanitarian
relief, policing, administration of justice, local government and
provision
of
utilities, environmental recovery and priorities for the return to
normality.”
The IPU was
inter‑departmental but based in the FCO.40
54.
On 12
February, responsibility for the ‘Iraq Stage IV Subjects Document’
was
transferred
to the newly formed inter‑departmental IPU.41
55.
On 29 January,
Mr Peter Gooderham, Political Counsellor at the British
Embassy
Washington,
reported that the NSC had asked whether the UK, as one of the
Occupying
Powers,
would be willing to take lead responsibility for reforming the
Iraqi judicial system
and Iraqi
Police Service (IPS).42
The NSC
said that the justice sector would be run by the
military
Coalition in the immediate aftermath, but the Iraqis should “regain
responsibility
for law and
order as quickly as possible”. That was described as having
“something up
and running
within 60 days”. The UK would be “best suited” to take on this role
because
of its
“wealth of experience and expertise”.
56.
On 31 January,
the UND submitted advice to Mr Straw, alerting him to the
request
and stating
that “this would be a massive undertaking, with implications for
the UK’s role
as an
‘Occupying Power’, that should more properly be an international
effort mandated
57.
Mr Straw
commented that the UK “should help the US on police and judicial
matters
as much as
possible”, but “this help has to be on the basis of what is
practical”.44
58.
On 4 February,
Mr Drummond wrote to Mr Chilcott following a meeting
between the
Cabinet
Office, the FCO, the MOD and DFID to consider the US
request.45
He
observed
39
Letter
Bowen to Ehrman, 5 February 2003, ‘Iraq: Operational Policy
Unit’.
40
Minute
Chorley to PS/Secretary of State [MOD], 12 February 2003, ‘Iraq:
Aftermath – Briefing for
Meeting
with OGD Ministers’.
41
Minute
Chorley to PS/Secretary of State [MOD], 12 February 2003, ‘Iraq:
Aftermath – Briefing for
Meeting
with OGD Ministers’.
42
Letter
Gooderham to Chaplin, 29 January 2003, ‘Iraq: Day After: US
Requests for Assistance on Judicial
Issues’.
43
Minute UND
[junior official] to Private Secretary [FCO], 31 January 2003,
‘Iraq the Day After – US
Requests
for Assistance on Judicial Issues’.
44
Minute PS
Foreign Secretary [FCO] to UND [junior official], 3 February 2003,
‘Iraq the Day After – US
Request for
Assistance on Judicial Issues’.
45
Minute
Drummond to Chilcott, 4 February 2003, ‘Iraq: Judicial
Issues’.
77