3.8 |
Development of UK strategy and options, 8 to 20 March
2003
(which the
proposed tests would help with); and a clear legal opinion about
the
circumstances
under which military action without a further resolution could
meet
the UK
Government’s commitment to respect international law.”
•
“Early and
public agreement with the USA on a UN SC mandate for the
civil
administration
and reconstruction of Iraq”, which would “almost certainly
require”
Mr Blair’s
personal involvement with President Bush. DFID understood
that
“it would
be illegal for us, the UN and many other donors to get involved in
the
reform of
Iraqi institutions and reconstruction of the country (beyond what
is
needed for
the delivery of immediate humanitarian assistance under our
Hague
and Geneva
Convention obligations) without a further … UNSC
mandate.
The absence
of agreement with the US on this is holding up
international
planning
and the prospects of burden sharing.”
•
It would be
“highly desirable” for Mr Blair to meet Mr Annan “soon
and more
often”.
That “would send a clearer signal of the certainty we attach to
the
UN role”.
•
The Quartet
Road Map “should be published before any military
action”.
Ms Short
felt “strongly that now is the time” for Mr Blair to get
President Bush
to “sign
up” to publication. Progress would “reduce the hostility to the
West and
tensions in
the Arab world which our actions in Iraq risk
provoking”.
404.
In relation to
the need for a legal opinion, Mr Chakrabarti
added:
“I know
DFID is not alone in wanting to see written advice from the
Attorney General
and/or
Ministerial discussion about the legality of military action
without the second
UNSCR. It
would be strongly desirable for the legal opinion, to cover the
range of
possible
voting outcomes, to be put to Ministers before the end of the week.
If that
legal
opinion gave backing to US/UK military intervention in the absence
of a second
resolution,
Clare believes the Government would still need a discussion on
the
political
merits of taking that course of action.”
405.
Mr Chakrabarti
suggested that the Government’s communications strategy
might
“make
clearer the UK’s concerns for the Iraqi people and the centrality
of the UN in
resolving
the crisis, including through a strong role for the UN after any
conflict”.
406.
Mr Chakrabarti
also suggested that “more frequent and systematic discussion
of
these
issues between senior ministers would be helpful”. He understood
that Mr Blair
might ask
senior ministers to meet more regularly if conflict started, but
advised starting
sooner,
“given the scale and significance of the decisions being taken”. In
addition,
Mr Blair
and Ms Short needed “to talk more often, probably on a daily basis
until
negotiations
on the second resolution are concluded”. “Most of her concerns”
were
“agreed
government policy”, but she needed to be reassured that they would
be “taken
fully into
account”.
471