Previous page | Contents | Next page
3.8  |  Development of UK strategy and options, 8 to 20 March 2003
(which the proposed tests would help with); and a clear legal opinion about the
circumstances under which military action without a further resolution could meet
the UK Government’s commitment to respect international law.”
“Early and public agreement with the USA on a UN SC mandate for the civil
administration and reconstruction of Iraq”, which would “almost certainly require”
Mr Blair’s personal involvement with President Bush. DFID understood that
“it would be illegal for us, the UN and many other donors to get involved in the
reform of Iraqi institutions and reconstruction of the country (beyond what is
needed for the delivery of immediate humanitarian assistance under our Hague
and Geneva Convention obligations) without a further … UNSC mandate.
The absence of agreement with the US on this is holding up international
planning and the prospects of burden sharing.”
It would be “highly desirable” for Mr Blair to meet Mr Annan “soon and more
often”. That “would send a clearer signal of the certainty we attach to the
UN role”.
The Quartet Road Map “should be published before any military action”.
Ms Short felt “strongly that now is the time” for Mr Blair to get President Bush
to “sign up” to publication. Progress would “reduce the hostility to the West and
tensions in the Arab world which our actions in Iraq risk provoking”.
404.  In relation to the need for a legal opinion, Mr Chakrabarti added:
“I know DFID is not alone in wanting to see written advice from the Attorney General
and/or Ministerial discussion about the legality of military action without the second
UNSCR. It would be strongly desirable for the legal opinion, to cover the range of
possible voting outcomes, to be put to Ministers before the end of the week. If that
legal opinion gave backing to US/UK military intervention in the absence of a second
resolution, Clare believes the Government would still need a discussion on the
political merits of taking that course of action.”
405.  Mr Chakrabarti suggested that the Government’s communications strategy might
“make clearer the UK’s concerns for the Iraqi people and the centrality of the UN in
resolving the crisis, including through a strong role for the UN after any conflict”.
406.  Mr Chakrabarti also suggested that “more frequent and systematic discussion of
these issues between senior ministers would be helpful”. He understood that Mr Blair
might ask senior ministers to meet more regularly if conflict started, but advised starting
sooner, “given the scale and significance of the decisions being taken”. In addition,
Mr Blair and Ms Short needed “to talk more often, probably on a daily basis until
negotiations on the second resolution are concluded”. “Most of her concerns” were
“agreed government policy”, but she needed to be reassured that they would be “taken
fully into account”.
471
Previous page | Contents | Next page