The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
where we
were there as the forces but Iraqis were involved in the
maintenance of
stability
and law and order; and then we would move to what we called
‘operational
overwatch’,
which gave the Iraqis far more control themselves of their own
affairs;
and we
moved then to ‘strategic overwatch’, which is what we eventually
did,
where we
stood back, the Iraqis had control of their own security but we had
a
re‑intervention
capability if it was at all necessary.”19
32.
Air Chief
Marshal Jock Stirrup, Chief of the Defence Staff, visited Baghdad
and
Basra from
1 to 3 July.20
In Basra,
Major General Jonathan Shaw, General Officer
Commanding
Multi-National Division (South-East) (MND(SE)), told ACM Stirrup
that
he was
confident the conditions set for PIC had been met; there was little
military
advantage
in retaining a presence at Basra Palace with the exception of
retaining a base
for strike
operations and for situational awareness. Maj Gen Shaw therefore
advocated
relocating
to Basra Air Station at “the earliest practicable point”. ACM
Stirrup agreed,
observing
that only “in extremis” would UK forces then re-enter the city, and
then only
in support
of the Iraqi Army.
33.
Gen Petraeus
and Ambassador Ryan Crocker, US Ambassador to Iraq,
remained
“circumspect”
on the timing of PIC in Basra. They considered that there
remained
“significant
problems” associated with “unstable politics” and “JAM
infiltration” and
advocated
the need for “a few ‘wins’” before formal transfer.
34.
ACM Stirrup
told them that the violence in Basra was “all about money and
power,
rather than
sectarianism” and he considered that UK forces vacating the city
centre
could
undermine the level of Iranian influence in the city. He argued
that:
“PIC
represented a catch 22 situation in which it was difficult to
demonstrate the
ability of
the provincial authorities to assume responsibility for security
without
having
handed over responsibility.”
35.
Mr Robert
Tinline, Deputy British Consul General in Basra, briefed ACM
Stirrup that
the UK had
“done as much as we can in Basra” and reported that although
General
Mohan
wanted UK forces out of Basra City he did not want full
PIC.
36.
Lieutenant
General Nicholas Houghton, Chief of Joint Operations, briefed
the
Chiefs
of Staff on 3 July that General Mohan:
“… appeared
to have formed a clear, objective and accurate assessment of
the
security
and social situation in Basra, which chimed with the UK’s position.
He
believed
that the MNF-I presence distorted the loyalties of Basrawis and
supported
Provincial
Iraqi Control (PIC) as a precursor to turning Iraqi nationalism
against
malign
Iranian influence.”21
19
Public
hearing, 5 March 2010, pages 151-152.
20
Minute Kyd
to PS/SofS [MOD], 5 July 2007, ‘CDS Visit to Iraq 1-3 Jul
07’.
21
Minutes, 3
July 2007, Chiefs of Staff meeting.
188