The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
800.
Mr Straw
agreed that most problems in Dr Blix’s report:
“… could be
resolved if Iraq complied. But there could be no doubt that Iraq
was
in further
material breach because of its non‑compliance. It was important
that
Iraq got
the message that time had almost run out. It would be stupid of
them not
to co‑operate
now.”
801.
Questioning
Mr Straw’s statement, Mr Ivanov said: “it was up to the
inspectors
to say
how much time they needed to complete their mission. If they needed
five to six
months, who
were we to say they should not get it.”
802.
Mr Straw
“accepted” that there was nothing in resolution 1441 on the timing.
That
was: “a
matter for the Security Council. But Iraq should have complied over
the past two
months, or
even in the 1990s.”
803.
Mr Ivanov
agreed that:
“… it was
for the Security Council to decide on timing … [T]he previous
inspectors
had worked
for eight years and done a great job. ElBaradei had told … [him]
that he
needed two
more months. Blix needed more time too. The Security Council
could
give the
inspectors time to finish their job.
“… the Blix
report had said nothing about a material breach.”
“… material
breach was not a matter for the inspectors, but for the Security
Council
or for
individual members. If one looked at OP4 … it was very hard to see
how Iraq
was not now
in further material breach.”
805.
Mr Ivanov
agreed that:
“… it was
for the Security Council to decide if there were a further material
breach.
But,
looking at the Blix and ElBaradei reports, Russia saw no reason to
declare
that Iraq
was in material breach. But there was a definite need to seek
further
co‑operation
from Iraq.”
806.
The JIC
assessed on 29 January that retaining WMD was a vital
Iraqi
interest and
that Saddam Hussein was unlikely to agree to relinquish
power
or go into
exile.
807.
The JIC
predicted that, once military action began, widespread lack of
loyalty
to the
regime would become clear and a hard‑fought professional defence
of
Baghdad was
“unlikely”.
144