The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
683.
Pressed as to
whether non‑compliance rather than evidence of weapons of
mass
destruction
justified “a war”, Mr Blair replied that he “profoundly”
disagreed with the idea
that a
refusal to co‑operate was of a “lesser order”. He
added:
“… what we
know is that he has this material … we know there is
something
like
350 tonnes of chemical warfare agent. We know there is
something like
30,000 special
munitions for the delivery of chemical and biological
weapons.
“He hasn’t
even told us where those old leftovers from 1998 are … we know …
that
there is an
elaborate process … of concealment …
“… the
people that the inspectors want to interview … are being told, by
the Iraqi
authorities,
they can only come for interviews with an Iraqi … minder, and only
be
interviewed
in certain places.
“And we
know also from intelligence that these people’s families are being
told that
if they
co‑operate and give any information at all they will be
executed.
“… if he
fails to co‑operate in being honest and he is pursuing a programme
of
concealment,
that is every bit as much a breach as finding, for example, a
missile
or chemical
agent.”
684.
Asked whether
there would be “another dossier” setting out what UK
intelligence
had
discovered, Mr Blair stated:
“… we have
the intelligence that says that Saddam has continued to develop
these
weapons of
mass destruction; that what he’s doing is using a whole lot of
dual‑use
facilities
in order to manufacture chemical and biological weapons; and … that
there
is an
elaborate programme of concealment … forcing the inspectors to play
a game
of hide and
seek.”
685.
Asked if he
had sufficient evidence to back action, Mr Blair
replied:
“… I’ve got
no doubt at all that he’s developing these weapons and that he
poses
a threat
but we made a choice to go down the UN route …
“… our
judgement, the American judgement … is that Saddam has these
weapons,
but the
purpose of the inspectors … is … to report back to the UN and say
whether
he is fully
co‑operating or he’s not.”
686.
Asked whether
a second resolution was needed, required or preferred,
Mr Blair replied:
“Of course
we want a second resolution and there is only one set of
circumstances
in which
I’ve said that we would move without one … all this stuff that …
we’re
indifferent
… is nonsense. We’re very focused on getting a UN resolution
…
“… you
damage the UN if the UN inspectors say he is not co‑operating, he’s
in
breach, and
the world does nothing about it. But I don’t believe that will
happen …”
122