The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

time taking strong and urgent action” with the IPS and MOI to stop abuse and torture.844

They would recommend a partial or complete withdrawal of support if the Iraqis were

not co‑operative.

884.  The advice said that the “Iraqis have promised action”. The Basra Governor

had agreed to establish an investigation committee following “strong pressure” from

Mr Chaplin and Mr Innes. It was not clear whether the Governor and Maj Gen Hassan

were willing to prosecute any officers if found guilty. The official added:

“It is even less clear that they will take firm action on the wider issues of abuse

that appear to be inherent in some Iraqi police detention facilities, notably that of

the PIU.”

885.  Dr Howells’ Assistant Private Secretary responded to IPU on 19 May.845 He agreed

the recommendation and asked for “firm, decisive and urgent action”. He also requested

that IPU raise the issue with the US administration (to “exert pressure on the Iraqis”),

and brief Ms Clwyd (to raise it “at a senior level on her visit to Iraq next week”).

886.  Dr Howells subsequently visited Baghdad from 13 to 15 September. He met

Mr Jabr and raised concerns about human rights abuses by the ISF, pressing for

independent investigations.846 Mr Patey handed Mr Jabr a dossier on three members

of the ISF in Basra who were implicated in abuses and requested their dismissal.

887.  In his weekly report on 22 May, DCC Smith wrote that he had attended a “police

to police meeting” on 18 May with Maj Gen Hassan, senior CPATT IPLOs and senior

ArmorGroup Advisers.847 Maj Gen Hassan was “pushed very firmly” to take action

against the PIU and “a range of options were put to him to assist in rooting out the

problem”. It was still hoped that he, with the backing of MOI, would “take action”.

888.  On 23 May, a junior MOD official briefed Dr Reid that FCO and MOD officials had

made “strong representations” to Iraqi authorities in Baghdad and Basra for thorough

investigations.848 UK forces had “minimised” their contact with the PIU and reduced joint

detention operations with the Iraqi police to those deemed essential. The official wrote

that, while the recent reports were “serious and disturbing”, they were “largely limited to

a small element of the IPS in one province, Basra”.

889.  Dr Reid noted this briefing on 24 May.849

844  Minute IPU [junior official] to PS/Howells, 18 May 2005 ‘Iraq: Murder and Abuse of Detainees in Iraqi

Detention Facilities’.

845  Minute APS/Howells to IPU [junior official], 19 May 2005, ‘Iraq: Murder and Abuse of Detainees in Iraqi

Detention Facilities’.

846  eGram 13565/05 Baghdad to FCO London, 18 September 2005, ‘Iraq: Visit by Dr Howells,

13‑15 September’.

847  Minute Smith, ‘Weekly Report – Week Ending Sunday 22 May 2005’.

848  Minute MOD [DJC‑SEC4] to APS/SofS [MOD], 23 May 2005, ‘Iraq: Reports of Abuse of Criminal

Detainees by Elements of the Iraqi Police Service’.

849  Minute Naworynsky to DJC‑SEC4, 24 May 2005, ‘Iraq: Reports of Abuse of Criminal Detainees by

Elements of the Iraqi Police Service’.

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