The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
218.
At the
meeting, Ministers agreed that “the MOD and FCO should provide
some
initial
thoughts on future force levels”.112
The FCO
contingency planning paper was
not discussed.
219.
Ministers were
also briefed that the US military was planning military
action
in Fallujah.
220.
An MOD note
provided in advance of the meeting said the US military
view
was that if
Fallujah was not dealt with, the MNF-I would be unable to control
the level
of violence
in the run-up to the January elections.113
The US
intention was that the
operation
should destroy remnants of the former regime, kill or capture Abu
Musab
al-Zarqawi,
regain the initiative from the insurgents and demonstrate both
campaign
progress
and the IIG’s resolve.
221.
The MOD did
not agree that ‘solving’ Fallujah was a prerequisite for
holding
successful
elections, which were unlikely to happen in the city in any case.
The UK
view was
that the operation carried a very high risk of unifying the
insurgency, acting
as a
trigger for Shia violence, “over-facing” the ISF and so delaying
Iraqiisatiion,
endangering
UN support for the elections and undermining coalition
cohesion.
222.
Ministers
agreed that an operation to clear Fallujah was right in principle
but the
UK should
try to persuade the US to give Prime Minister Allawi time to
improve the
political
environment.114
223.
Mr Blair was
recorded as saying that the UK’s overarching political and
military
objective
was to create a security situation that allowed elections to be
held in an
environment
which gave Prime Minister Allawi a good chance of fielding a
winning slate.
224.
Mr Blair
raised the formal US request for a UK deployment to North
Babil.
225.
Gen Walker
told the Group that the UK had the capability to meet the US
request.
Although
North Babil was a more dangerous area of operations than MND(SE),
this
was a
militarily less demanding request than the UK had faced in the past
or might
face in
the future. But it seemed unlikely that the 30 day timescale for
the deployment
would
hold.
226.
In discussion,
a member of the Group observed that “the risks of agreeing
were
more
political than military, and related to the UK being involved in
facilitating a Fallujah
operation
that might draw criticism”.
227.
A final
decision was deferred to the following week, when the MOD
would
provide advice.
112
Minutes, 14
October 2004, Ad Hoc Ministerial Group on Iraq
meeting.
113
Note MOD,
12 October 2014, ‘Fallujah’.
114
Minutes, 14
October 2004, Ad Hoc Ministerial Group on Iraq
meeting.
432