The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
505.
Adm Boyce
directed Lt Gen Reith to “push for a ‘niche’ role for the UK …
and
make it
clear that the UK was ready to be asked to contribute further in
order to exploit
any
operational opportunities that arose during the campaign”, subject
to US logistics
support and
assurances that UK forces would be “relieved-in-place” as soon as
possible
for Phase
IV activities in the South.
506.
Discussing a
draft of a Ministerial note on Phase IV operations, the Chiefs of
Staff
noted that
delivering an exemplary Phase IV required “the concomitant
resources and
OGD [Other
Government Departments] commitment”. Adm Boyce stressed that
Phase
IV could
not be delivered by military activity alone.
507.
Adm Boyce
directed that the Ministerial note should include indicative
numbers to
give a
better understanding of what was being provided in terms of medium
scale and
large scale
commitment. The minutes recorded:
“It was
also important to emphasise that MOD commitments should be
guided
by DPAs
[Defence Planning Assumptions], which provided for large scale up
to
6 months.
Medium scale was to be considered a divisional HQ plus a bde
[brigade]
of troops.
Undertaking such an operation for longer would break harmony
guidelines
and was
likely to lead to the Department’s failure to meet its PSA [Public
Service
Agreement]
targets.”
508.
The MOD
advised Mr Blair on 6 March that the UK might play
additional
“cutting
edge” roles in combat operations.
509.
On 6 March, Mr
Watkins informed Sir David Manning that the MOD’s
assumption
that UK
land forces would “hold ground behind the advancing US formations”
had been
“overtaken
by events”.169
The
“continuing impasse over Turkey” could result in the
UK
playing
“additional ‘cutting edge’ roles”.
510.
Both 3
Commando Brigade and 16 Air Assault Brigade had achieved
their
full
operating capability and 7 Armoured Brigade was expected to do so
“by about
18 March”.
Although the timing of the start of military action remained
uncertain,
“a sizeable
proportion of the UK land package” was now likely to be in a
position to
participate
in combat operations from the start of the ground
campaign.
“As a
result, 1(UK) Div is now likely to represent a higher and more
significant
proportion
of the overall combat power available in the early stages of the
ground
campaign.”
512.
Mr Hoon and
the Chiefs of Staff judged that “it would not be wise at this late
stage
to seek a
major revision to the US plan”, but that it could make better use
of some of the
169
Letter
Watkins to Manning, 6 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Options for Employment of
UK Land Forces’.
464