The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

CENTCOM commanders, key staff and Coalition partners from 15 to 16 January in

Tampa, Florida.101 Gen Franks had described the event as “likely to be the last chance

for such a gathering to take place. It therefore had to be conclusive”.

293. Lt Gen Reith told the Inquiry that he had had a conversation with Gen Franks on

16 January:

“… I told him that we still obviously weren’t committed necessarily to execution, but

that the Prime Minister had approved a composite, one-division package. So that

was the mix, that we eventually ended up with.”102

294. At that meeting, Lt Gen Reith and Gen Franks had discussed Phases II and III

and Gen Franks had “agreed that 3 Commando Brigade would be the best capability

to attack into the al-Faw Peninsula”.

295. Lt Gen Reith told the Inquiry that Gen Franks’ feeling was that 7 Armoured Brigade

16 Air Assault Brigade could “probably secure the oilfields”, releasing the US 3rd Infantry

Division and I Marines Division for “the main effort. So we would then have a discrete

box in southern Iraq”.

296. Asked whether the UK was still suggesting that the US should have two sets of

plans in case the UK could not contribute, Lt Gen Reith told the Inquiry:

“I told him that the Prime Minister had agreed to the package, and so therefore …

I’m making an assumption that he now expected us to participate.”103

297. Maj Gen Wilson reported that “Phase IV responsibilities became a little clearer”

at the Commanders’ Conference. Gen Franks had demanded that JTF-4 deploy as

soon as possible to Kuwait and had welcomed Lt Gen Reith’s offer to embed four UK

personnel in it. Gen Franks had also directed that “key Phase IV players should visit the

Pentagon to ensure that planning was joined up”.104

298. In his record of the meeting with Gen Franks, Lt Gen Reith explained that UK staff

embedded in JTF-4 would have “reach-back” to the Phase IV planning team in PJHQ,

giving the UK “considerable influence over US planning”.105 He reported that Gen Franks

had “agreed that we could plan on [the] UK having responsibility for the Basra region in

Phase IV and would welcome our setting the standard for other nations. Clearly this will

need Ministerial approval in due course.”

101 Minute Wilson to MA/CJO, 17 January 2003, ‘CENTCOM Component Commanders’ Conference:

15-16 Jan 03’.

102 Private hearing, 15 January 2010, pages 40-41.

103 Private hearing, 15 January 2010, page 42.

104 Minute Wilson to MA/CJO, 17 January 2003, ‘CENTCOM Component Commanders’ Conference:

15-16 Jan 03’.

105 Minute Reith to PSO/CDS, 17 January 2003, ‘Discussion with General Franks – 16 Jan 03’.

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