3.6 |
Development of UK strategy and options, November 2002 to January
2003
630.
In advance
of the Security Council meeting on 27 January, Mr Straw and
the
FCO were
concerned to identify a strategy which would allow more time for
the
strategy of
coercion to work.
631.
Mr Straw
visited Washington and repeated the political arguments for
trying
to get a
second resolution on 23 January.213
632.
Mr Straw
and Secretary Powell discussed the inspectors’ reports to the
Security
Council on
27 January, the need to “shift the burden of proof to Iraq” and the
need to
ensure
there were no differences between the US and UK.214
633.
Mr Straw
made the case for a second resolution in his subsequent meeting
with
Mr Dick
Cheney, US Vice President, telling him that “the key question was
how to
navigate
the shoals between where we were today and a possible decision to
take
military
action”.215
The UK
would be “fine” if there was a second resolution; and that
it
would be
“ok if we tried and failed (a la Kosovo). But we would need
bullet‑proof jackets
if we did
not even try”. In response to Vice President Cheney’s question
whether it would
be better
to try and fail than not to try at all, Mr Straw said the
former.
634.
In the
subsequent discussion, Mr Straw stated that:
•
The
composition of the Security Council since 1 January “made
matters
more difficult”.
•
If there
were “a half decent statement” from Dr Blix and
Dr ElBaradei (to the
Security
Council on 27 January), “which enumerated Iraqi shortcomings,
we
would have
the beginnings of a further material breach as defined by OP4
of
[resolution]
1441. We could then use a period of time – weeks not months –
to
negotiate a
second resolution.” The text of such a resolution would “write
itself”.
•
The effort
of getting a second resolution “would help the UK and – he
thought –
the US to
nail the canard that the US was operating outside the
international
community.
It would also help with the ‘day‑after’.”
•
Mr Blair
“felt strongly that diplomatic effort could make the military
effort
easier.
If the international community was united, then the Arabs
could go to
Saddam with
a strong message that he had either to go or his regime
would
face
destruction. Arab leaders were desperate to get rid of Saddam. A
second
resolution
would embolden them.” If the international community was split,
that
would
“embolden Saddam Hussein”.
•
People in
the UK had a “sense of the UN as a legitimator of
action”.
Vice President
Cheney said the same was true in the US.
213
Telegram 93
Washington to FCO London, 23 January 2003, ‘Foreign Secretary’s
Meeting with
Vice President
of the United States, 23 January’.
214
Telegram 91
Washington to FCO London, 23 January 2003, ‘Iraq: Foreign
Secretary’s Lunch with
US Secretary
of State, 23 January 2003’.
215
Telegram 93
Washington to FCO London, 23 January 2003, ‘Foreign Secretary’s
Meeting with
Vice President
of the United States, 23 January’.
111