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3.6  |  Development of UK strategy and options, November 2002 to January 2003
630.  In advance of the Security Council meeting on 27 January, Mr Straw and the
FCO were concerned to identify a strategy which would allow more time for the
strategy of coercion to work.
631.  Mr Straw visited Washington and repeated the political arguments for trying
to get a second resolution on 23 January.213
632.  Mr Straw and Secretary Powell discussed the inspectors’ reports to the Security
Council on 27 January, the need to “shift the burden of proof to Iraq” and the need to
ensure there were no differences between the US and UK.214
633.  Mr Straw made the case for a second resolution in his subsequent meeting with
Mr Dick Cheney, US Vice President, telling him that “the key question was how to
navigate the shoals between where we were today and a possible decision to take
military action”.215 The UK would be “fine” if there was a second resolution; and that it
would be “ok if we tried and failed (a la Kosovo). But we would need bullet‑proof jackets
if we did not even try”. In response to Vice President Cheney’s question whether it would
be better to try and fail than not to try at all, Mr Straw said the former.
634.  In the subsequent discussion, Mr Straw stated that:
The composition of the Security Council since 1 January “made matters
more difficult”.
If there were “a half decent statement” from Dr Blix and Dr ElBaradei (to the
Security Council on 27 January), “which enumerated Iraqi shortcomings, we
would have the beginnings of a further material breach as defined by OP4 of
[resolution] 1441. We could then use a period of time – weeks not months – to
negotiate a second resolution.” The text of such a resolution would “write itself”.
The effort of getting a second resolution “would help the UK and – he thought –
the US to nail the canard that the US was operating outside the international
community. It would also help with the ‘day‑after’.”
Mr Blair “felt strongly that diplomatic effort could make the military effort
easier. If the international community was united, then the Arabs could go to
Saddam with a strong message that he had either to go or his regime would
face destruction. Arab leaders were desperate to get rid of Saddam. A second
resolution would embolden them.” If the international community was split, that
would “embolden Saddam Hussein”.
People in the UK had a “sense of the UN as a legitimator of action”.
Vice President Cheney said the same was true in the US.
213  Telegram 93 Washington to FCO London, 23 January 2003, ‘Foreign Secretary’s Meeting with
Vice President of the United States, 23 January’.
214  Telegram 91 Washington to FCO London, 23 January 2003, ‘Iraq: Foreign Secretary’s Lunch with
US Secretary of State, 23 January 2003’.
215  Telegram 93 Washington to FCO London, 23 January 2003, ‘Foreign Secretary’s Meeting with
Vice President of the United States, 23 January’.
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