The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
remained.
He suggested that “it would be helpful to neutralise work
programme
arguments –
e.g. by pointing to a post-conflict UNMOVIC/IAEA disarmament
role”.
746.
In a press
conference after the meeting, Mr Annan announced that he
was
withdrawing
staff from Iraq following a warning from the US authorities the
previous
day “that
it would be prudent not to leave our staff in the
region”.258
Mr Annan
also
announced
that several UN mandates, such as the Oil-for-Food programme, would
be
suspended,
but the UN would “find a way of resuming our humanitarian
activities” and
to do
“whatever we can to give them [the Iraqi population] assistance and
support”.
Regardless
of how the issue was resolved, the Security Council would have a
role
to play
in post-conflict Iraq.
“I have
made it very clear that in my judgement if the Council were to be
able to
manage this
process successfully and most of [sic] the collective will to
handle
this operation,
its own reputation and credibility would have been
enhanced.
And I have
also said if the action is to take place without the support of the
Council,
its legitimacy
will be questioned and the support for it will be
diminished.”
748.
In response to
questions, Mr Annan stated that war was “always a
catastrophe”
and would
lead to “major human tragedy”:
“… nobody
wanted that and this was why we had hoped that the Iraqi
leadership
would have
co-operated fully and would have been able to do this [disarm]
without
resort to
the use of force. But the little window that we seem to have seems
to be
closing
very, very fast. I am not sure at this stage the Council can do
anything in
the next
couple of hours.”
749.
Sir Jeremy
Greenstock’s proposal to cast “heavy blame on the French”
for
the failure
to reach agreement and his draft statement to the Security Council
on
17 March
were sent to No.10 and the FCO for clearance.
750.
The terms of
Sir Jeremy’s statement about the position of France were
almost
unchanged
from the draft text he had sent to London earlier that day asking
for
instructions
and comments.259
751.
Sir Jeremy
subsequently told the Inquiry that, in making his statement to
the
Security
Council on 17 March, casting blame on France, he “was acting
under
instructions”.260
The “basic
telegram” drafting his statement had gone “backwards
and
forwards
[between London and New York]”, but he had spoken to Mr Straw
by telephone
on 16
March.
258
United
Nations, 17 March 2003, Press
Encounter with the Secretary-General at the Security
Council
Stakeout
(unofficial transcript).
259
Telegram
453 UKMIS New York to FCO London, 17 March 2003, ‘Elements of
Statement on Iraq’.
260
Private
hearing, 26 May 2010, pages 37-38.
532