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9.2  |  23 May 2003 to June 2004
72.  It had also been agreed that Mr Blair would write to Mr Bush after the telephone call
to reinforce the UK’s concerns, and to Ambassador Bremer to list specific projects in the
Basra area that required immediate CPA funding.
73.  At the meeting, “US generals refusing to order troops to deploy on foot” had been
identified as one factor compounding security problems in Baghdad. An unwillingness
to operate at night, predictable patterns of deployment, an inadequate understanding
of the security picture across the city, the impact of de-Ba’athification and a failure to
co‑ordinate international police assistance were also listed as contributory factors.
74.  Mr Blair spoke to President Bush later on 6 June.30 In his report of the conversation
to Mr McDonald, Mr Cannon wrote that Mr Blair had said that his main concern was
administration; Ambassador Bremer needed to be able to break through the bureaucratic
obstacles that he faced.
75.  Mr Blair raised the difficulty Ambassador Bremer was having accessing the funding
he needed. UK projects in Basra had been affected and Mr Blair said that he would write
to both Ambassador Bremer and President Bush setting out those projects.
76.  Mr Blair also discussed the security situation with President Bush; General Tommy
Franks, Commander in Chief US Central Command (CENTCOM), and Ambassador
Bremer were of the view that it was improving.
77.  In the course of the discussion, Mr Blair also raised the need for action on
replacing Iraq’s currency and the de-Ba’athification process, which are considered in
Sections 10.1 and 11.1 respectively.
78.  On 9 June, the MOD’s Strategic Planning Group (SPG) submitted a paper to the
Chiefs of Staff on the “strategic intent and direction” of the UK’s contribution to Iraq.31
The SPG wrote that:
“The greatest concern remains lawlessness and there are signs that more organised
opposition to the Coalition may be emerging. There are also signs of rising
discontent amongst Iraqis at the Coalition’s failure to deliver a safe and secure
environment. This is most marked in Baghdad …
“Baghdad is the key to success in Iraq … Failures within the city will threaten a
successful conclusion to the campaign. The US recognise this and are responding
… The UK is attempting to provide support and advice to this central effort,
largely through the CPA … But we must also protect our achievements in our
southern AO [Area of Operations] and both the South and the Centre will require
additional resources if we wish to see a sound and lasting strategy developed
and implemented.”
30  Letter Cannon to McDonald, 6 June 2003, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s conversation with Bush, 6 June’.
31  Minute SECCOS to PSO/CDS, 10 June 2003, ‘OP COS Paper: UK contribution to Iraq: strategic intent
and direction’ attaching Paper SPG, 9 June 2003, ‘UK contribution to Iraq: strategic intent and direction’.
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