9.2 | 23
May 2003 to June 2004
72.
It had also
been agreed that Mr Blair would write to Mr Bush after
the telephone call
to
reinforce the UK’s concerns, and to Ambassador Bremer to list
specific projects in the
Basra area
that required immediate CPA funding.
73.
At the
meeting, “US generals refusing to order troops to deploy on foot”
had been
identified
as one factor compounding security problems in Baghdad. An
unwillingness
to operate
at night, predictable patterns of deployment, an inadequate
understanding
of the
security picture across the city, the impact of de-Ba’athification
and a failure to
co‑ordinate
international police assistance were also listed as contributory
factors.
74.
Mr Blair
spoke to President Bush later on 6 June.30
In his report
of the conversation
to
Mr McDonald, Mr Cannon wrote that Mr Blair had said
that his main concern was
administration;
Ambassador Bremer needed to be able to break through the
bureaucratic
obstacles
that he faced.
75.
Mr Blair
raised the difficulty Ambassador Bremer was having accessing the
funding
he needed.
UK projects in Basra had been affected and Mr Blair said that
he would write
to both
Ambassador Bremer and President Bush setting out those
projects.
76.
Mr Blair
also discussed the security situation with President Bush; General
Tommy
Franks,
Commander in Chief US Central Command (CENTCOM), and
Ambassador
Bremer were
of the view that it was improving.
77.
In the course
of the discussion, Mr Blair also raised the need for action
on
replacing Iraq’s
currency and the de-Ba’athification process, which are considered
in
Sections
10.1 and 11.1 respectively.
78.
On 9 June, the
MOD’s Strategic Planning Group (SPG) submitted a paper to
the
Chiefs of
Staff on the “strategic intent and direction” of the UK’s
contribution to Iraq.31
The SPG
wrote that:
“The
greatest concern remains lawlessness and there are signs that more
organised
opposition
to the Coalition may be emerging. There are also signs of
rising
discontent
amongst Iraqis at the Coalition’s failure to deliver a safe and
secure
environment.
This is most marked in Baghdad …
“Baghdad is
the key to success in Iraq … Failures within the city will threaten
a
successful
conclusion to the campaign. The US recognise this and are
responding
… The UK is
attempting to provide support and advice to this central
effort,
largely
through the CPA … But we must also protect our achievements in
our
southern AO
[Area of Operations] and both the South and the Centre will
require
additional
resources if we wish to see a sound and lasting strategy
developed
and implemented.”
30
Letter
Cannon to McDonald, 6 June 2003, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s
conversation with Bush, 6 June’.
31
Minute
SECCOS to PSO/CDS, 10 June 2003, ‘OP COS Paper: UK contribution to
Iraq: strategic intent
and
direction’ attaching Paper SPG, 9 June 2003, ‘UK contribution to
Iraq: strategic intent and direction’.
219