4.2 | Iraq WMD assessments, July to September 2002

756. Mr Blair told Cabinet on 23 September that the dossier “would show that the

policy of containment had worked up to a point” but Saddam Hussein “continued

to rebuild” his weapons of mass destruction.

757. Cabinet met at 5pm on 23 September. The discussion is addressed in Section 3.5.

758. Cabinet members were given a copy of the dossier to be published the

following day.

759. In relation to the dossier, Mr Blair told his colleagues:

“… the dossier on Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction would show that the policy

of containment had worked up to a point, but that Saddam Hussein … continued

to rebuild his programme to acquire such weapons. The evidence showed his efforts

to procure equipment and materials, and to restore production facilities. This was

an issue for the United Nations, with whose Security Council resolutions Iraq had

not complied. A new resolution was being negotiated.”422

760. No specific discussion of the contents of the dossier was recorded although in the

discussion the point was made that the “development of weapons of mass destruction

by Saddam Hussein presented a quite different order of threat”.

761. Summing up the discussion, Mr Blair said that a “crunch point” had been reached:

“The sanctions regime … was being eroded and Saddam Hussein was on the way

to acquiring new capability in weapons of mass destruction. Iraq had to comply with

the obligations placed on it by the United Nations …”

762. Mr Campbell wrote that Mr Blair had explained that the dossier “brought together

accumulated evidence about Iraq’s attempts to build WMD, part historical, part

intelligence-based”; “not saying that he [Saddam Hussein] was about to launch an attack

on London, but we were saying there was an attempt to build a WMD programme in a

significant way”.423

763. Lord Turnbull, Cabinet Secretary from September 2002 to September 2005, told

the Inquiry:

“I think the dossier was ostensibly an attempt to inform the public. But one of the

effects it had was that the Cabinet all read it and basically decided – they absorbed

it and accepted it.”424

422 Cabinet Conclusions, 23 September 2002.

423 Campbell A & Hagerty B. The Alastair Campbell Diaries. Volume 4. The Burden of Power: Countdown

to Iraq. Hutchinson, 2012.

424 Public hearing, 13 January 2010, page 61.

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