12.1 |
Security Sector Reform
Minister
had some sympathy with the view of Maliki and the US that we
should
consider
increasing the size of the Iraqi Army. The countervailing argument
was that
it was the
ability to use troops available effectively that was the real
constraint on
the ISF’s
effectiveness. In either case, there was a political argument for
absorbing
some of the
militia forces into the ISF. The US was exploring the options but
the
potential
costs had yet to be established.”994
1078.
No.10 wrote to
the MOD on 10 July to report that Mr Blair was “very concerned
at
the recent
attack statistics” from Iraq, particularly the “widely reported
sectarian killings”
in
Baghdad.995
Mr Blair
judged that “overcoming the evident lack of engagement
against
the
militias by the Iraqi Government and security forces is a major
strategic task”. As
well as
continuing to press the Iraqi Government to take action, it was
important for the
UK to “have
a clearer view of what action is required, to complement and make
up for
the
shortcomings of the current Baghdad and Basra security plans”. In
addition, he was
concerned
that the evidence demonstrated that the ISF were not as capable as
had
previously
been assessed. No.10 asked for advice on addressing both of those
issues.
1079.
Mr Browne’s
Private Secretary replied to No.10 suggesting that the UK
should
press Prime
Minister Maliki to:
•
“re‑emphasise
publicly the theme of national unity”;
•
conduct a
vigorous internal reform of the MOI;
•
agree a
four‑step “militia engagement plan” comprising political engagement
of
figures
with militia links, public engagement to establish popular support,
military
engagement
to neutralise militia presence on the streets and a DDR process
to
absorb
ex‑militia members”;
•
overhaul
the Baghdad Security Plan; and
•
work with
Muqtada al‑Sadr to make him choose between politics and
“populist
1080.
On 16 July, Lt
Gen Fry reported continuing concerns that in the MOI “the
insidious
effects of
political and militia affiliations are beginning to compromise any
claim it might
have for
institutional integrity”.997
1081.
Lt
Gen Fry thought that Mr Boulani would need help to address
those issues
and
reported that Gen Casey had commissioned the development of an
internal reform
programme
for the Ministry.
994
Minutes, 6
July 2006, DOP(I) meeting.
995
Letter
Banner to McNeil, 10 July 2006, ‘Iraq: Security’.
996
Letter
McNeil to Banner, 11 July 2006, ‘Iraq: Security’ attaching Paper,
[undated], ‘Summary – Update
on Progress
of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF)’.
997
Minute Fry
to PSO/CDS, 16 July 2006, ‘SBMR‑I Weekly Report (218): 16 July
2006’.
303