9.6 |
27 June 2007 to April 2008
thereafter”.
Although the length of the “overwatch” period had not been formally
defined,
the US
was:
“… likely
to expect ‘overwatch’ in the South to be delivered through a
long-term (one
year plus),
substantive UK military commitment … This is at odds with much
UK
military
thinking … The military does not want an open-ended commitment,
with our
forces at
BAS [Basra Air Station] confined to carrying out a limited range of
training
tasks for
the ISF while exposed to continuing high levels of rocket and
mortar fire.
They
believe we should enter overwatch with a clear plan for its nature
and duration:
effectively,
a timetable for withdrawal.”
108.
The IPU
reported that the impact on civilian activity in Basra City would
be
considerable
since:
“… our
diplomatic mission in Basra will not be able to continue after UK
forces leave.
We will
similarly have to make plans for our post-PIC political and
civilian capacity-
building
role in the South which take this reality into
account.”
109.
Mr McDonald
visited Washington from 17 to 18 July and met a number of
senior
members of
the US Administration, including Dr Condoleezza Rice, the Secretary
of
State,
Mr Hadley and Mr Robert Gates, the Defense
Secretary.47
They
reported that “the
military
aspects of the surge were going well” and that Gen Petraeus was
likely to report
on progress
in early September. Thereafter, the direction of US policy was not
clear, but:
“… we would
definitely enter a new phase, in which the coalition would protect
the
Iraqi
population in a new role. The US was not simply going to ‘stay the
course’.”
110.
Mr McDonald
told his US interlocutors that:
“… the UK
objective was not to change its posture in Iraq until
September.
There was
no difference between the approach of Gordon Brown and that of
his
predecessor.
But the Government was under huge pressure to move after
that,
and to get
ahead of the US. We needed to manage our own transition in a way
that
worked for
Iraq, and worked for Transatlantic relations.”
111.
Reflecting on
the report of Mr McDonald’s visit, Maj Gen Shaw observed
that
he was
“struck by the predominant mood of uncertainty and apprehension” in
the US
112.
In his own
account of a dinner with Mr Hadley and Secretary Rice,
Mr McDonald
recorded a
discussion about Basra Palace:
“Dr Rice
said she had told Crocker to pull his civilians out just as soon
as
accommodation
was ready at the airport. They had already suffered too
many
47
Letter
Gould to Hayes, 20 July 2007, ‘US: Simon McDonald’s trip to
Washington: 17/18 July’.
48
Minute Shaw
to CJO, 26 July 2007, ‘GOC MND(SE) – Southern Iraq Update – 26 July
2007.
205