3.6 |
Development of UK strategy and options, November 2002 to January
2003
“It is one
at which all of us should feel concerned. Resolution 1441
is
Saddam Hussein’s
last chance to disarm using a peaceful means …
“Sadly this
week the UN weapons inspectors have confirmed that his
long‑established
pattern of deception, denial and non‑compliance with
UN Security Council
resolutions is continuing …
“The United
Nations Charter charges the Security Council with the task of
preserving
international
peace and security.
“To do so
the Security Council must maintain its credibility by ensuring
full
compliance
with its resolutions.
“We cannot
allow a dictator to systematically violate those resolutions. If
they are not
complied
with, the Security Council will lose its credibility and world
peace will suffer
as a
result.
“We are
confident that the Security Council will face up to its
responsibilities.”
772.
Mr Blair
decided to speak to a number of his colleagues to establish their
views,
particularly
about the circumstances in which they would support military
action, before
his meeting
with President Bush.256
Mr Blair
also planned to speak to them again after
the
visit.
773.
Sir Stephen
Wall, the Prime Minister’s Adviser on European Issues, was
also
asked to
speak to a number of his European counterparts.257
774.
Mr Blair
and Mr John Howard, the Prime Minister of Australia, discussed
the
position on
Iraq on 28 January. Mr Blair said that, militarily, it might
“be preferable
to proceed
quickly”, but it “would be politically easier with a UN
resolution”. He:
“… intended
to tell President Bush that the UN track was working. Blix had said
…
that Saddam
was not co‑operating. If he repeated this in reports on 14
February, and
perhaps in
early March there would be a strong pattern on non‑co‑operation and
a
good chance
of a second resolution.”258
775.
Mr Blair
and Mr Howard agreed that a second resolution would be
“enormously
helpful”.
It would be better to try and fail than not to try at all for a
second resolution but
they should
“pencil in a deadline beyond which, even without a second
resolution, we
should take
a decision”. Mr Blair said that his instinct was that “in the
end, France would
come on
board, as would Russia and China”.
256
Letter
Rycroft to McDonald, 27 January 2003, ‘Iraq: Contacts Before Camp
David’.
257
Minute
Rycroft to Wall, 28 January 2003, ‘Iraq: A Pitch for the
Europeans’.
258
Letter
No.10 [junior official] to McDonald, 28 January 2003, ‘Prime
Minister’s Telephone Conversation
with John
Howard’.
139