6.2 |
Military planning for the invasion, January to March
2003
232.
Mr Hoon stated
that it was “a high readiness, balanced and flexible force
package,
bringing
together a wide range of capabilities”; and that he and the Chiefs
of Staff were
“confident”
that it was “the right group of forces for the tasks that may be
necessary”.
233.
Mr Hoon
concluded that none of the steps being taken represented “a
commitment
of British
forces to specific military action”, and that:
“A decision
to employ force has not been taken, nor is such a decision imminent
or
inevitable.
I must also emphasise … that the deployment of forces on this scale
is
no ordinary
measure.
“While we
want Saddam Hussein to disarm voluntarily, it is evident that we
will not
achieve
that unless we continue to present him with a clear and credible
threat of
force. That
is why I have announced these deployments, in support of the
diplomatic
process to
which we remain fully committed. It is not too late for Saddam
Hussein
to
recognise the will of the international community and respect
United Nations
resolutions.
Let us hope that he does so.”
234.
Mr Hoon
declined to provide any further details of the planning for
military action.
235.
In response to
a question about post-conflict planning, Mr Hoon stated:
“Certainly
consideration
is being given to aftermath issues and the question of humanitarian
relief.
Obviously,
we will design force packages to ensure that we have soldiers in
place who
can deal
with those issues as and when they arise.”78
236.
The
proposal to deploy UK ground forces to southern Iraq constituted a
step
change in
the UK contribution to the US plan and made it critical to the
success
of the
military campaign.
237.
Mr Hoon’s
letter of 16 January seeking agreement to the deployment
was
sent to Mr
Brown, Mr Straw and Sir Andrew Turnbull.
238.
It did not,
however, address the wider implications of the decision
for
Cabinet
colleagues.
239.
It was
clear, from the discussions on 15 January and Mr Hoon’s advice
to
Mr Blair of
16 January, that committing UK forces was likely to mean that the
UK
would
become responsible, as the Occupying Power in the immediate
aftermath
of military
operations, for a significant area of southern Iraq.
240.
That would
have implications for the responsibilities of the FCO and
DFID.
241.
It also had
major financial implications.
78
House of
Commons, Official
Report, 20
January 2003, column 37.
419