7 | Conclusions: Pre-conflict strategy and planning

Security Council for a resolution determining that Iraq had failed to take the

final opportunity offered by resolution 1441.

234. Mr Straw wrote to Mr Blair on 11 March setting out his firm conclusion that:

“If we cannot gain nine votes and be sure of no veto, we should not push our second

resolution to a vote. The political and diplomatic consequences for the UK would

be significantly worse to have our … resolution defeated … than if we camp

on 1441 …”111

235. Mr Straw set out his reasoning in some detail, including that:

• Although in earlier discussion he had “warmed to the idea” that it was worth

pushing the issue to a vote “if we had nine votes and faced only a French veto”,

the more he “thought about this, the worse an idea it becomes”.

• A veto by France only was “in practice less likely than two or even three vetoes”.

• The “best, least risky way to gain a moral majority” was “by the ‘Kosovo route’ –

essentially what I am recommending. The key to our moral legitimacy then was

the matter never went to a vote – but everyone knew the reason for this was that

Russia would have vetoed.”

236. Mr Straw suggested that the UK should adopt a strategy based on the argument

that Iraq had failed to take the final opportunity offered by resolution 1441, and that the

last three meetings of the Security Council met the requirement for Security Council

consideration of reports of non-compliance.

237. Mr Straw also identified the need for a “Plan B” for the UK not to participate

in military action in the event that the Government failed to secure a majority in the

Parliamentary Labour Party for military action.

238. Mr Straw concluded:

“We will obviously need to discuss all this, but I thought it best to put it in your mind

as event[s] could move fast. And what I propose is a great deal better than the

alternatives. When Bush graciously accepted your offer to be with him all the way,

he wanted you alive not dead!”

239. There was no reference in the minute to President Chirac’s remarks the previous

evening.

240. When Mr Blair and President Bush discussed the position late on 11 March, it was

clear that President Bush was determined not to postpone the start of military action.112

They discussed the impact of President Chirac’s “veto threats”. Mr Blair considered that

President Chirac’s remarks “gave some cover” for ending the UN route.

111 Minute Straw to Prime Minister, 11 March 2003, ‘Iraq: What if We Cannot Win the Second Resolution?’

112 Letter Cannon to McDonald, 11 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s Conversations with Bush and

Lagos, 11 March’.

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