3.3 |
Development of UK strategy and options,
April to July 2002
other than
military or military-related ones as defined in paragraph 24 of
resolution 687
(1991) or
covered by the GRL, would be permitted. Applications for licences
to trade
still had
to be scrutinised by the Office of the Iraq Programme, the UN
Monitoring,
Verification
and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) and the International Atomic
Energy
Agency
(IAEA), and the 661 Committee; and exporters would still be paid
through the
UN escrow
account established by resolution 986 (1995) only after
verification by UN
agents that
items had arrived in Iraq.
39.
Although the
resolution was adopted unanimously, Syria made a statement
arguing
that it was
time to lift sanctions against Iraq; it was unreasonable to impose
sanctions
for an
unlimited period of time; and the Council had lost credibility by
compelling some
countries,
and not others, to implement its resolutions. Syria rejected the
“double
standards …
whereby Israel carried out its policy of blatant aggression against
the
Palestinian
people, despite the statements of United Nations representatives
concerning
the war
crimes that it [Israel] committed in Jenin”.14
40.
There was no
reference in either the resolution or any statements in the
Security
Council to
the need for clarification of resolution 1284 (1999) as requested
by Iraq in its
meeting
with Mr Annan.
41.
Nor was there
discussion of a renewed call for Iraq to permit weapons inspectors
to
return to
Iraq. That remained the subject of continuing talks between Iraq
and Mr Annan
and debate
between the five Permanent Members (P5) of the Security
Council.
42.
Mr Straw
informed Cabinet on 16 May that resolution 1409 had been
adopted,
and that
the provision to limit scrutiny by the UN sanctions committee to
applications
to export
military and dual-use equipment was a significant step forward in
ensuring
that the
sanctions regime could not legitimately be blamed for causing
humanitarian
43.
There was no
further discussion of the policy.
44.
In his written
statement to the Inquiry, Mr Carne Ross, First Secretary
responsible
for the
Middle East at the UK Permanent Mission to the UN in New York,
stated that the
UK’s
position on Iraq was under “unceasing pressure, mainly from Iraq’s
allies” in the
Security
Council:
“… for
sanctions to be eased to reward Iraq for past progress in disarming
itself …
and to
incentivise Iraq to co-operate once more with the weapons
inspectors.
There was
also significant concern over the humanitarian impact of sanctions
…
There was
also a broader complaint, particularly in the Arab world, that the
US/UK
practised
double standards in demanding the full implementation of
resolutions on
14
UN Security
Council, ‘4531st Meeting Tuesday 14 May 2002’
(S/PV.4531).
15
Cabinet
Conclusions, 16 May 2002.
11