9.2 | 23 May 2003 to June 2004

“… only the US and UK had the professionalism, together with the readiness

to provide the guarantee of warfighting back-up, that would enable the Iraqis to

progressively take over responsibility for security.”

1112. In Sir Kevin’s discussions, no-one had suggested the deployment made the

difference between strategic success or failure in Iraq. He advised:

“Were there to be a more serious risk of strategic failure, then there would be a need

perhaps to reconsider at least as far as troop numbers are concerned.”

1113. The record of points on Iraq discussed at the video conference between Mr Blair

and President Bush on 22 June indicates that Mr Blair argued that Prime Minister

Allawi and Lt Gen Petraeus should keep working on a detailed plan for Iraqiisation, for

publication.633 Mr Blair said that it appeared that the obstacles to that process were being

removed and that both the quantity and quality of the ISF were increasing. He suggested

that the NATO Summit in Istanbul should be the vehicle to get agreement from NATO to

support training in Iraq.

1114. The Chiefs of Staff meeting on 23 June was, according to Mr William Ehrman,

who attended on behalf of the FCO:

“… taken up by Afghanistan. There were no points of note on Iraq. Chiefs noted that

the Defence Secretary would write to the Prime Minister that day recommending that

the HQ ARRC be deployed to Afghanistan in 2006.”634

1115. On the same day, Mr Hoon’s Private Secretary wrote to Mr Blair’s Private

Secretary to explain that the case for deploying HQ ARRC to Iraq was receding.635

Although it would have provided a visible expression of the UK commitment to success

in Iraq, and might have increased UK influence over the direction of the overall

campaign, any military effect would not be felt until the autumn. In any case, the security

concerns that had led to the US requesting additional UK forces had reduced.

1116. Instead, Mr Hoon supported planning for a 2006 deployment of HQ ARRC to

Afghanistan. That would not preclude deployment to Iraq later in 2004 if the security

situation were to deteriorate dramatically.

1117. Sir Nigel Sheinwald told the Inquiry that Ministers had decided not to deploy the

ARRC to Iraq because they did not think there was a sufficiently compelling case for

doing so, and because the ARRC “might be needed in the future should we move into a

more ambitious military role in Afghanistan”.636

633 Letter Quarrey to Owen, 22 June 2004, ‘Prime Minister’s VTC with Bush, 22 June: Iraq’.

634 Minute Ehrman to Thompson, 23 June 2004, ‘Chiefs of Staff, 23 June: Afghanistan’.

635 Letter Naworynsky to Quarrey, 23 June 2004, ‘Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC): deployment

options’.

636 Public hearing, 16 December 2009, page 87.

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