9.6 |
27 June 2007 to April 2008
“Either
way, we will need to work up a strong public script, setting out
the positive
aspects of
the work we have done in Basra since 2003, and why the situation on
the
ground
justifies Ministers’ decisions on UK
drawdown/withdrawal.”
918.
Sir Nigel
Sheinwald, British Ambassador to the US, wrote to Mr McDonald
on
31 March
to express concern that the analysis of the options did not fully
take into
account the
risk to the UK’s relationship with the US, particularly in the
run-up to
a
Presidential election.454
He argued
that it was essential to allow recent events in
Basra to:
“… shake
down before we can sensibly take firm decisions on the right
presence
and
approach over the coming 12-18 months, decisions which are going to
have a
major
impact, not just on our Iraq policy but also our relations with the
US and our
international
reputation.
“Over the
past five years we have repeatedly said that we will draw down
our
troops as
fast as conditions and Iraqi capabilities allow. It would be
difficult, in the
US and
elsewhere, to justify a draw down under present conditions in these
terms.
If anything,
the recent deterioration would suggest that we consider the reverse
…”
919.
Sir Nigel
commented that the Washington media were already picking
up
“mutterings
of dissatisfaction” about the UK’s contribution in Basra from some
lower level
US military
sources. Any suggestion that the UK was considering earlier
withdrawal was
likely to
stir up much greater criticism:
“… our
reputation in the US will be significantly damaged if we are seen
to leave
Basra in
chaos or if UK forces have to be backfilled by US
troops.”
920.
Sir Nigel
thought that the US continued to believe that the UK military had a
valid
continuing
role in MND(SE): training and mentoring the ISF, protecting supply
routes and
providing a
re-intervention capacity. But he cautioned that, once the situation
in Basra
had settled
down, it would be necessary to reconsider the UK’s military posture
there,
because the
“major gaps” in UK situational awareness in Basra City “directly
affects our
credibility
here [in Washington]”. He therefore hoped that serious
consideration would be
given to
embedding UK troops with ISF units “as the US already do and as we
ourselves
do in
Afghanistan”.
921.
Mr Browne
reported to Cabinet on 1 April about recent events in
Basra.455
He said
that the decision to launch the Charge of the Knights had come as
a
surprise to everybody.
454
Letter
Sheinwald to McDonald, 31 March 2008, ‘Iraq: NSID, 1
April’.
455
Cabinet
Conclusions, 1 April 2008.
353