12.1 |
Security Sector Reform
“Finally,
given the importance right now of the Iraqis being able to assume
the
lead, we
should take the opportunity to deal with the public demands which
PM
Maliki made
last week on equipment – repeating in public what he has said to
us
in private.
In fact, the position in IA 10 Div is relatively good, but the
Iraqis continue
to look for
symbols of force to over‑face the militia. We have managed to
bring
forward the
deployment of some 240 Humvee vehicles – 140 are now in place –
and
we are
expecting some heavy calibre arms over the next month. On my visit
I will
again press
Defence Minister Qadir to spend his capital budget wisely and
quickly
including
for 10 Div.”
1329.
On 29 January,
Mr Banner requested further details from the MOD on
equipment
issues and
MiTTing (as support for police reform).1229
1330.
On 30 January,
Mr Banner briefed the Prime Minister that one of the two
“key
issues” for
the US was that the UK should have “an embedding/MiTT programme
similar
to their
own”.1230
The MOD was
“working on this” but was, Mr Banner felt,
“reluctant”.
1331.
Mr Blair
met Lieutenant General Nicholas Houghton, Chief of Joint
Operations,
and senior
officials from FCO and SIS to discuss the situation in Basra on 31
January.1231
The issue
of embedding mentors was raised. Lt Gen Houghton explained
that the UK
approach to
mentoring in Basra was different to that being developed by the US,
in
part
because of a differing context; the US were primarily embedding
with Shia forces
operating
in hostile Sunni areas, whereas the UK was working with Shia forces
in Shia
areas. He
stated: “We, not they, drew the fire of local militias”, hence most
UK mentoring
would take
place at headquarters level and at bases.
1332.
Mr Blair
also expressed concern about the Iraqi ability to ensure
security
after
re‑posturing. Lt Gen Houghton noted that the UK would retain a
re‑intervention
capability,
and that it was “important to allow 10 Division to act
independently”. He
conceded
that there was still considerable work to be done to improve
leadership in
10th Division
and fill equipment gaps “where it was difficult to take bilateral
action
specific to
10th Division, given the prioritisation system in place via
MNSTC‑I”. Mr Blair
stated that
it was “essential that our plans resulted in a 10 Division that was
able to
defeat JAM
whenever it encountered them in an open fight. This would be the
only way
to instil
wider confidence in the security situation.”
1333.
The MOD
responded to Mr Banner’s request on 2
February.1232
On
equipment,
the MOD
denied that there were any shortages for 10th Division. It
explained that
relevant
training must take place before equipping could be completed, and
that that
1229
Letter
Banner to Siddiq, 29 January 2007, ‘Iraq’.
1230
Minute
Banner to Blair, 30 January 2007, ‘Iraq Meeting, 31
January’.
1231
Letter
Banner to Siddiq, 31 January 2007, ‘Iraq: Meeting with
Officials’.
1232
Letter
Forber to Banner, 2 February 2007.
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