The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

• the ability effectively to counter Iranian influence, including handling the borders;

and

• protecting the main MNF supply routes through southern Iraq.

368.  Mr Prentice continued:

“We have invested heavily since 2003 in the South, in treasure, blood and

reputation. We should be careful at this late stage not to waste that investment.

We are not currently planning further infrastructure development projects but the

successful programmes in local government capacity building and police leadership

training and mentoring need to continue if they are to achieve sustainable results.”

369.  Mr Prentice advised that the options for future UK roles and deployments would

need to:

• reflect UK regional and strategic interests;

• address US expectations;

• take account of UK domestic political requirements;

• “satisfy UKMOD force generation constraints and the needs of the Afghanistan

theatre”; and

• provide a secure platform in the South for non-military tasks.

370.  On Basra, Mr Prentice wrote that the formal transfer of responsibility for security

would “have a more psychological than real effect” given that the UK’s re-posturing

to Basra Air Station was, in effect, “de facto PIC”. He understood that US officials

suspected that the idea of de facto PIC was:

“… a device to slide past proper analysis of the conditions for PIC. These suspicions

about PIC are fuelled by their continued uncertainty about our longer term intentions.

The best means to win US support for PIC in Basra on our preferred timing will

therefore be to calm their anxieties about our plans for the South and our continued

military and non-military contribution to building Iraq’s future.”

371.  On 13 September, Maj Gen Binns reported that Basra remained quiet.185 There

had been no attacks on the COB in the preceding week and a “decrease in collateral

casualties, especially around Basra Palace”. While the situation remained fragile, there

were positive indications to suggest that the militias had increased their contacts with the

ISF and were moving towards a political accommodation.

372.  Gen Mohan had attended a meeting of the “Basra Security Forum”, facilitated

by OMS, and reported that it had been well attended by all the major parties except

Fadilah. Maj Gen Binns observed that this was the first time that there had been

185  Minute Binns to CJO, 13 September 2007, ‘GOC HQ MND(SE) – Southern Iraq Update –

13 September 2007’.

254