The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
of the UN
weapons inspections”. Mr Blair had “made no attempt to
pretend” that what
Dr Blix
might report “would make any difference to the countdown to
invasion”. In his
speech in
Glasgow on 15 February, Mr Blair had said that he wanted to
“solve the
issue”
through the UN: “Today he was telling me that the solution was not
going to
be disarmament
through the UN, but regime change through war.”
989.
Secondly,
Mr Blair “did not try to argue” Mr Cook out of the view
that “Saddam
did not
have any real weapons of mass destruction that were designed for
strategic
use against
city populations and capable of being delivered with reliability
over
long distances”.
990.
Mr Straw
told Mr Blair that the Labour Party would not support
action
beginning
the following week.
991.
Mr Blair
wrote in his memoir that Mr Straw had:
“… come
over after PMQs. He was genuinely alarmed and worried about
the
political
fallout. ‘If you go next Wednesday with Bush and without a
second
resolution,
the only regime change that will be happening is in this room.’ He
said it
as a friend
and colleague, and he meant it.”307
992.
In his memoir,
Mr Straw gave a similar account of that discussion, explaining
that
his warning
“was not about what I would do. I’d support him. But I felt … we
would not
muster the
numbers when it came to the vote in the Commons.”308
993.
Mr Blair
and President Bush discussed developments on 5 March.
994.
Mr Blair
proposed amending the draft resolution by adding a
deadline
for a decision
by the Security Council.
995.
On 5 March,
Sir David Manning agreed with Dr Rice that Mr Blair and
President
Bush should
speak later that day to discuss possible amendments to the
resolution,
including
the question of a deadline, and to review the lobbying
campaign.309
Sir
David
told
Dr Rice that Chile and Mexico would need “something on timing,
and meeting
their need
for some sort of benchmarking”. His preference was to focus on the
issue
of interviews.
Sir David suggested welcoming Dr Blix’s “clusters” document on
7 March
as “graphic
proof” of Saddam Hussein’s failure to disarm over the last 12
years.
996.
Sir David also
said that the UK was looking at ways of trying to
discount
Dr ElBaradei’s
decision to close the nuclear file by asking detailed
questions.
307
Blair
T. A
Journey.
Hutchinson, 2010.
308
Straw
J. Last Man
Standing: Memoirs of a Political Survivor. Macmillan,
2012.
309
Letter
Manning to McDonald, 5 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Conversation with Condi
Rice’.
358