6.2 |
Military planning for the invasion, January to March
2003
UNMOVIC, to
the UN on 27 January, and it was being assumed that Mr Blair would
be
218.
Mr Straw
recommended that Mr Blair should speak to President
Bush.
219.
Mr Straw’s
advice and the subsequent discussions with the US are
addressed
in Section
3.6.
220.
Mr Straw wrote
to Mr Blair on 17 January, flagging up three major issues:
targeting;
the
response to any Iraqi use of WMD; and the need for greater clarity
on thinking and
plans for
the aftermath.70
221.
Mr Straw
advised that:
“… much
greater clarity is required about US thinking and plans for the
aftermath.
How long
would UK forces be expected to stay in the area of responsibility
proposed
for them?
What would be their role in what form of administration, not least
in
Basra …?
We need in particular far greater clarity on US thinking on
management
of the
oilfields. As you know, we have sizeable differences of view from
many
in the
US Administration who envisage Iraq being a US military
governorate for
an extended
period of time. A UK team will be discussing this issue with the
US
next week.
It will be putting hard questions, and highlighting our own view
that
there needs
to be a move to UN administration, with Coalition Forces
remaining
responsible
for security, as soon as possible.”
222.
Sir David
Manning commented to Mr Blair:
“Good
questions. But I don’t think they affect your decision in
principle.”71
223.
Mr Blair
replied, “agreed”.72
224.
Following a
telephone conversation, Sir David replied to Mr Watkins
late
on
17 January that Mr Blair was “content to proceed on the basis
of the Defence
Secretary’s
recommendations”, and that he would be grateful “if you and the
FCO
would now
take things forward as proposed”.73
225.
Mr Hoon’s
Private Office informed key officials of Mr Blair’s decision, and
that
Mr Hoon
had approved:
•
That the US
be informed that its planning should assume the contribution of
the
proposed UK
land force package to carry out the role requested, subject
to:
69
Letter
Straw to Manning, 16 January 2003, ‘Iraq: Conversation with Colin
Powell, 16 January’.
70
Minute
Straw to Prime Minister, 17 January 2003, ‘Iraq: UK Land
Contribution’.
71
Manuscript
comment Manning, 17 January 2003, on Minute Straw to Prime
Minister, 17 January 2003,
‘Iraq: UK
Land Contribution’.
72
Manuscript
comment Blair on Minute Straw to Prime Minister, 17 January
2003,
‘Iraq: UK
Land Contribution’.
73
Letter
Manning to Watkins, 17 January 2003, ‘Iraq: UK Land
Contribution’.
417