The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
137.
SIS3 told the
Inquiry:
“I assumed,
as others did, that there was indeed WMD. I mean, it was very
swiftly
shown that
the nuclear reporting was pretty accurate and the missile reporting
was
accurate.
But the CBW, obviously, that became clear within a few weeks that
there
was a
problem. We had expected to come across facilities or shells and so
on, and
we didn’t.
Therefore there was already political clamour, if you
like.”70
138.
On
21 April, Mr Straw expressed scepticism to Mr Blair
about the likelihood
that
physical evidence of Saddam Hussein’s WMD would be
found.
139.
On
28 April, Mr Blair told the media “we can take our time
about this and so
we should”.
He expressed confidence that WMD would be found.
140.
On
21 April, Mr Straw told Mr Blair:
“I am very
worried that, inexorably, we are being pushed into a position where
we
accept that
the war will only have been justified if a significant WMD find is
made.
This is
exactly the place where our opponents, at home and abroad, and the
media
want us. We
should not go there.
“The
military action was justified the day we took it, on the grounds
that:-
•
the Saddam
regime had had chemical and biological weapons – we
know
that for
sure;
•
it had
failed to meet a mountain of UN obligations;
•
a huge
number of questions about its WMD position and
capabilities
remained
unanswered (Blix’s 173 page report), and Iraq simply refused
to
co-operate
properly, raising entirely legitimate issues in the minds of
most
members of
the Security Council that they had a lot to hide.”71
“However, I
remain sceptical that physical evidence of WMD will be
found:-
•
Saddam had
every motive, and months of notice before the fall of
Baghdad
to destroy
all WMD evidence; so did his collaborators;
•
remarkably
little circumstantial evidence has so far been
forthcoming;
•
the
expectations from the intelligence have always been greater than
the
product, so
far;
70
Private
hearing, 2010, page 4.
71
Minute
Straw to Prime Minister, 21 April 2003, ‘Iraq: the Search for
WMD and the Case for the War’.
452