The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
181.
A recurring
issue between 2003 and 2007 was the difficulty of translating
the
Government’s
strategy for Iraq into action by departments. The system that drove
policy
on the
invasion of Iraq, which centered on No.10, could not be easily
transformed into
a system
for the effective management of the aftermath, in which a coherent
collective
effort was
needed to pull together the many interrelated strands of activity
required.
Although
Iraq was designated the UK’s highest foreign policy priority, it
was not the top
priority
within individual departments. As a consequence, Whitehall did not
put significant
collective
weight behind the task.
182.
One indication
of that, as described in Section 13, was the failure to resource
the
UK effort
coherently. Others included:
•
Sir Nigel
Sheinwald’s identification of “definite signs of Iraq
fatigue”59
within
Whitehall
in September 2004, and his advice to Mr Blair that he would
have to
press for
greater engagement.
•
Concerns
expressed by Sir Nigel and Mr Blair in July 2005 about the
ability to
deliver Sir
Nigel’s “Comprehensive Strategy”.
•
Mr Jonathan
Powell’s identification in September 2005 that amongst
those
dealing
with Iraq a “weary cynicism and feeling that it is all inevitable
has sunk
in”60
and
Mr Blair’s recognition that the new strategy proposed would
require
Mr Powell
to spend “much time pushing it through”.61
•
Mr Blair’s
observation in April 2007 that the FCO and the MOD were unwilling
to
push
forward further work on reconciliation, meaning “we will have to do
it”.62
183.
Throughout the
UK’s engagement in Iraq there was a tendency to focus on
the
most
positive interpretation of events.
184.
One
manifestation of that was failure to give weight to the candid
analysis that was
regularly
supplied by the JIC, by some commanders in theatre, and by others
that things
were going
wrong.
185.
The default
position was to judge that negative events were isolated
incidents
rather than
potential evidence of a trend which should be monitored and
which
might
require a policy response. This meant that underlying causes were
not always
investigated
and brought to light.
186.
This became a
particularly serious issue in relation to considering whether
the
conditions
for transfer to PIC had been met.
59
Minute
Sheinwald to Prime Minister, 13 September 2004, ‘Visit to Iraq:
Some Impressions’.
60
Minute
Powell to Prime Minister, 21 September 2005, ‘Iraq:
Strategy’.
61
Manuscript
comment Prime Minister to Powell on Minute Powell to Prime
Minister, 21 September 2005,
‘Iraq:
Strategy’.
62
Manuscript
comment Blair on Minute Banner to Prime Minister, 27 April 2007,
‘Iraq Update, 26 April’.
502