12.1 |
Security Sector Reform
our MiTTs –
many Iraqi soldiers fear the MiTTs simply draw the enemy’s
fire.
‘Partnership’
is key, as we saw on Op SINBAD …”
1323.
In his
statement to the Inquiry, Former Chief Superintendent Barton said
that, by
early 2007,
“the security situation had worsened so much that it was impossible
to move
around the
city in anything other than a Warrior”.1217
He wrote
that due to the security
risk,
inspection visits “would often be as short as twenty minutes”; in
comparison, an
inspection
at a UK station would take “at least one full day”.
In his
weekly report from 31 January, Major General Jonathan Shaw, GOC
MND(SE)
from
January 2007 until August 2007, reported that elements of 10th
Division were likely
to be
called to Baghdad in the near future for a combat
role.1218
He
assessed: “while the
10th Division
has proven itself capable of basic tasks … they are not yet combat
proven.
Asking them
to deploy to Baghdad in this role at this stage risks asking too
much of them.”
Two
battalions of 10th Division were expected to move north in support
of the Baghdad
Security
Plan in late February.1219
Each
battalion was to be accompanied by a team of four
“military
observers”1220
who would
“co‑locate with US forces”.
On 12
February, MOD officials recommended that two four‑man UK teams
should embed
alongside
US MiTTs with the two 10th Division battalions being deployed to
Baghdad.1221
By 21
February, plans had expanded to include a UK team of 24 based at
Besmaya (from
where ISF
were being forward deployed to Baghdad) to help the US prepare
other ISF
units for
the Baghdad Security Plan.1222
In his
evidence to the Inquiry, Major General Graham Binns, GOC MND(SE)
from August
2007 until
February 2008, recalled:
“… when the
unit that we had trained from 10 Division deployed to Baghdad,
we
mentored
and we sent mentoring teams with them to Baghdad … this was
something
that had
evolved in Basra but not Baghdad.”1223
1324.
On 8 January,
No.10 wrote to departments requesting a number of
additional
reports (as
described earlier in this Section), including a weekly report on
developments
in ISF
capability, stating that Mr Blair wished to know of problems,
and how and by
whom they
would be tackled.1224
1217
Statement,
7 June 2010, pages 9‑10.
1218
Minute Shaw
to CJO, 31 January 2007, ‘GOC MND(SE) – Southern Iraq Updated – 24
[sic] January’.
1219
Minutes, 7
February 2007, Chiefs of Staff meeting.
1220
These
“military observers” were later described at MiTTs.
1221
Minute PJHQ
[junior official] to PS/SofS [MOD], 12 February 2007, ‘Iraq:
Op TELIC: Deployment of
Two Iraqi
Army Battalions to Baghdad with Embedded UK Military Training
Team’.
1222
Minute MOD
[junior official] to PS/SofS [MOD], 21 February 2007, ‘Iraq – Media
Handling of the MiTT
Deployments
to Baghdad’.
1223
Public
hearing, 15 January 2010, page 17.
1224
Letter
Banner to Siddiq, 8 January 2007, ‘Iraq’.
361