The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
To do this
effectively, they need our support, politically, in their economy
and for their
armed
forces.
•
First, we
need a strong political compact in Iraq led by the Iraqi
Government
to bring
all parties together, with clear commitments to
non‑sectarian
government
and to democracy;
•
Second, we
need to build Iraqi governing capability, especially in
the
disbursement
of money for reconstruction and rebuilding of the
economy;
•
Third, we
must plug any gaps in training, equipment and command
and control
in the Iraqi Army and help the new Interior Minister root
out
sectarianism
in the police, which in turn will allow us, within the
timeframe
set down by
General Casey, to transition to Iraqi control.”
277.
Mr Blair
went on to explain that “a major part of the answer to Iraq lies
not in Iraq
itself but
outside it”, creating a need for a “whole Middle East” strategy
which would
“start with
Israel/Palestine”, make progress on Lebanon and “unite all moderate
Arab
and Moslem
voices behind a push for peace”.
278.
On 14 November
Mr Blair, accompanied by Sir Nigel Sheinwald, spoke by
video
link to the
Iraq Study Group for an hour.158
279.
In
preparation, Mr Blair’s Private Secretary provided a briefing
pack and a letter
from
Mr Sawers, written from Baghdad, reflecting on the three days
he had spent
280.
Mr Sawers
reported that Prime Minister Maliki was “anxious to assume
more
responsibility
for security as soon as possible” but was more resistant to the
need for
a “broad
base of political support for his government”. Mr Sawers
described “areas
of progress”,
specifically “on the economy, on a new oil law, and on building up
the
Army” and
said that “the prospects don’t look as bleak as they are portrayed
in the
Western
media”.
281.
Mr Sawers
wrote that progress had been made on a new Security
Council
resolution,
with the terms of a letter to the Security Council requesting
rollover of the
previous
resolution agreed between the US and Iraqi
Governments.
282.
Finally,
Mr Sawers recommended that Mr Blair stress to the Iraq
Study Group
“the
importance to Maliki of securing the earliest possible transition
of security
responsibilities”
and that he “warn starkly against partition of Iraq”.
283.
Mr Blair’s
Private Secretary reported to the FCO that during his session
with
the Iraq
Study Group Mr Blair advocated a new plan that “set out the
way forward for
Iraq”
agreed by the coalition, UN and Iraqi Government.160
The key
elements would be
158
Letter
Banner to Siddiq, 14 November 2006, ‘Iraq Study
Group’.
159
Letter
Sawers to Prime Minister, 13 November 2006, ‘Iraq’.
160
Letter
Banner to Siddiq, 14 November 2006, ‘Iraq Study
Group’.
54