6.4 |
Planning and preparation for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, mid-2001
to January 2003
1042.
In the House
of Commons on 7 January, Mr Hoon announced the first call out
of
Reservists
for possible operations in Iraq and the deployment of the UK’s
Amphibious
Task Group
(ATG) to the Mediterranean.497
1043.
In the debate
that followed, Mr Tam Dalyell (Labour) asked what would
happen
when
Coalition forces reached Baghdad.498
Mr Hoon
explained that Afghanistan provided
“very
recent experience on which to draw”. He invited Mr Dalyell to “look
carefully at
the efforts
that have been made by the United Kingdom, as part of the
international
community,
to stabilise Afghanistan and provide it with very significant
support as it
grapples
with the difficulties of rebuilding itself, its economy and
ultimately, we hope,
a democracy”.
1044.
During
January, Written Parliamentary Questions on different aspects of
post-
conflict
planning were addressed to Mr Straw, Ms Short and Mr
Hoon:
•
Dr Jenny
Tonge (Liberal Democrat) asked Mr Straw what representations
the
UK had made
to the US on post-war food, sanitation and water
supplies.
Mr Mike
O’Brien, FCO Parliamentary Under Secretary of State, replied that
no
decision
had been taken on military action and that the UK regularly
discussed
all aspects
of Iraq policy with US colleagues.499
•
Mr Hugo
Swire (Conservative) asked Ms Short what assessment had
been
made of the
potential humanitarian consequences of war. Ms Short replied
that
DFID was
considering a wide range of contingencies which took into account
the
current
humanitarian situation in Iraq.500
•
Mr John
Lyons (Labour) asked Mr Hoon what role British troops would play
in
post-war
Iraq. Mr Adam Ingram, Minister of State for the Armed Forces,
replied:
“There is
no inevitability about military action against Iraq; this
question
is
therefore hypothetical at this stage. What I can say is that we
take very
seriously
our current and potential responsibilities towards the Iraqi
people.
In the
aftermath of any conflict, Britain would remain at the forefront
of
efforts to
help the Iraqi people.”501
1045.
At the end
of December 2002, the focus of the Chiefs of Staff and
military
planners
switched from northern to southern Iraq, creating a
contingent
liability
that the UK would be responsible for the post-conflict occupation
and
administration
of a UK AOR in the region around Basra.
497
House of
Commons, Official
Report, 7 January
2003, column 24.
498
House of
Commons, Official
Report, 7 January
2003, column 30.
499
House of
Commons, Official
Report, 20
January 2003, column 80W.
500
House of
Commons, Official
Report, 22
January 2003, column 307W.
501
House of
Commons, Official
Report, 27
January 2003, column 630W.
289