The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
“So you are
absolutely right to distinguish between the body of the paper
and
the
judgements, but it is a distinction which was made consciously and
with
269.
Sir John
Scarlett told the Inquiry that the 9 September Assessment “stayed
in
place as
the confirmed view of the JIC in the months that followed and it
didn’t change
270.
The
Assessments Staff and most members of the JIC were not aware at
the
time of the
details of the sourcing chains and that little of the information
provided
by
“reliable sources” was based on first-hand knowledge.
271.
In the context
of comments on the intelligence underpinning the
judgements
in the Assessment
of 9 September, the Butler Report stated:
“… the JIC
did not reflect in its Assessment, even if only to dismiss it,
material in
one of
those reports suggesting that most members of the Iraqi leadership
were not
convinced
that it would be possible to use chemical and biological
weapons.”126
272.
Commenting on
the Assessment, the Butler Review concluded that:
“By
mid-September 2002, therefore, readers of JIC assessments will have
had
an impression
of continuity with, but also some change from, the JIC
assessment
of 15
March:
a.
The
continuing clear strategic intent on the part of the Iraqi regime
to pursue
its nuclear,
biological, chemical and ballistic missile programmes.
b.
Continuing efforts by the Iraqi regime to sustain and where
possible develop
its indigenous
capabilities.
c.
The
apparent considerable development, drawing on these capabilities,
of
Iraq’s
‘break-out’ potential. Although Iraq’s nuclear programme continued
to be
constrained,
there was strong evidence of continuing work on ballistic
missiles,
including
the development and production of systems with ranges in
excess
of limits
set by the United Nations. There was also evidence from one
source,
supported
by one complementary report, of Iraq having the ability to
produce
biological
agent in mobile facilities, and additional evidence of activity at
one
site
formerly associated with Iraq’s biological warfare programme.
Finally, there
were recent
intelligence reports, albeit mainly inferential, that Iraq was
producing
chemical
agent. For analysts, intelligence on Iraqi production of
biological
and
chemical agent would have been put alongside Iraq’s proven ability
to
weaponise
agent onto at least some delivery systems, and separate
intelligence
124
Private
hearing, 5 May 2010, pages 86-87.
125
Public
hearing, 8 December 2009, page 41.
126
Review of
Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction [“The
Butler Report”], 14 July 2004, HC 898,
paragraph
304.
164